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THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
COMMUNIST CELL AS A SOCIAL FORCE: ITS EFFECT ON  
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM



To my wife and

my father



THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA  
COMMUNIST CHINA AS A NUCLEAR POWER: ITS EFFECTS ON  
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

by



LEO YUEH-YUN LIU

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## ABSTRACT

In the present international political system, which can best be described as a loose bipolar system, a sense of stability and moderation appears to prevail. Both superpowers have not only exercised a certain degree of self-restraint, but have also imposed certain restraints on other countries in the world, including their allies. The existence of a bloc of non-aligned countries and of the United Nations has further contributed to world stability.

However, since 1964, Communist China has been conducting a series of nuclear tests. The rate and scope of this testing indicates that Communist China has initiated a program of rapid and thorough nuclear development. It is the purpose of this dissertation to determine whether or not Communist China, as a potential operational or major nuclear power, would seriously affect the present system and international stability. This study indicates that the spread of nuclear weapons to countries in the world is not only dangerous but also destabilizing. Communist China is no exception.



In addition, both its national and ideological interests dictate to Communist China a negative policy toward the present international system, which, in the view of the Chinese, reflects the "monopoly" and "co-domination of the world" by the "imperialist" United States and the "revisionist" or even "social imperialist" Soviet Union. It appears that Communist China has decided to become a major nuclear power in order to upset the present international system.

This study indicates that the development of Communist China's nuclear capability tends to be an undesirable factor in the maintenance of the present international system. When Communist China becomes a major nuclear power, this influence will be destabilizing as well as increasingly undesirable.



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## INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Communist China has been emerging as another nuclear power in the international political system. Since 1964, it has conducted nine nuclear tests. They ranged from the first enriched-uranium bomb in 1964 to a nuclear warhead carried by a guided missile in 1966, a multi-megaton H-bomb in late 1968 and, most recently, an underground test in late 1969. Thus, Communist China has conducted a very impressive variety of tests and at the same time demonstrated rapid progress in nuclear weapons development. It is therefore imperative to determine whether Communist China will become a major nuclear power and if so, whether that would affect the present international system. The Chinese basic foreign policy objectives, its nuclear capability and its future nuclear development are all important factors to be considered.



## CHAPTER I

### PRESENT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

The present international system can be broadly described as a "loose bipolar system." The term "loose bipolar" represents only a very vague and artificial framework for describing the present situation for the sake of expediency. Actually, there are no really adequate terms which could be used to describe precisely what the state of the "international political system" is.

Despite of this lack of adequately descriptive terminology, it is possible to isolate several variables that appear to be essential to the maintenance of the present system. Basically, a loose bipolar system is a system consisting of the following actors or groupings of actors.

1. Two major national actors.

2. Two loose camps each being headed by a major national actor and other national actors, to various degrees, "tied" to the major national actors. The word "tie" refers to the military, political, legal and economical relations between the major national actors and their camp members.



Within each camp, there are one or more military alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Central Treaty Organization, South-east Asia Treaty Organization and Warsaw Treaty Organization, which reflect the military and political confrontation between the two camps.

3. A group of non-aligned countries which are by and large independent from the two camps.

4. One or more universal actors such as the United Nations.

It is not, however, sufficient to merely identify the major actors, it is also necessary to describe the relationships among them. It is only by first isolating and identify these relationship that changes in the present system can be successfully evaluated. There are basically six "isolatable" characteristics:

1. The military, economic, and political capabilities of the two major national actors, namely the United States and the Soviet Union are greater than that of any other national actors in the system. Only they possess the overwhelming



military and economic resources necessary to qualify them as "superpowers." Their power to coerce and to reward is infinitely greater than that of any country. It is, however, important to note that although there has been a balance of strength and military capability between the two major national actors, their capabilities are by no means precisely equal in every respect.

2. Only the superpowers possess invulnerable second-strike nuclear forces. Thus, if either superpower were to launch a nuclear attack on the other, the victim would retain sufficient nuclear force to launch a retaliatory nuclear attack on its attacker and cause it irreparable damage. Consequently, there is little incentive for either superpower to launch a preemptive attack on its adversary. Nor does either superpower need to fear that its adversary's preemptive attack would destroy its nationhood completely.

Furthermore, continuous technological advancement has tremendously increased the destructive capability of nuclear weaponry. Because of the increasing costs of the use of nuclear weapons,



many writers believe that both superpowers are cautious in their relations with other countries and with each other. In this way, world war has been prevented. For example, Hans Thirring in 1955 claimed that nuclear deterrence had made for the basic abolition of large-scale world war, conventional as well as nuclear, once and for all.<sup>1</sup> Thirring is, of course, wrong. Conventional wars such as the present Middle East "on and off" war still take place. Nevertheless, a nuclear stalemate does exist between the superpowers. Both of them appear to realize that their nuclear weapons must remain unused; the alternative being mutual suicide. Consequently, neither superpower would maneuver the other into an extreme situation out of the fear that its adversary might become sufficiently desperate to use its nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup>

In the past few years, the superpowers have experienced many crises in such areas as Quemoy, Suez, and Cuba, wherein they have made threats of nuclear war. These threats however, were made in a rather cautious manner and none of them were made for aggressive or offensive purposes.<sup>3</sup> For example, the Soviet threat in the Quemoy crisis



was not made until the crisis was virtually over and there was apparently no longer any danger of a nuclear war. The threat made by the United States during the Cuban crisis was intended to force the Soviet Union to remove its missiles, which appeared to threaten American security, from Cuba. It seems that both superpowers have exerted themselves in order to avoid an all-out war. As Ciro Elliott Zoppo points out:

While threats of nuclear war have been made by both Soviet and American leaders in crises or local-conflict situations, the avoidance of all-out nuclear war seems to have become an established "rule" of the international system.<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, Hans J. Morgenthau correctly observes that "atomic power, monolithically controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union and keeping each other's destructive capability in check, is a force for peace, however precarious."<sup>5</sup>

3. Within each camp, the superpower has restrained its members. Thus, in the Suez crisis, the United States limited British and French military activity; in the Taiwan Strait crisis, the United States has forced the Nationalist Chinese to promise that they would not use military force to attack



the Mainland; in 1958, the Soviet Union refused to support Communist Chinese bombardment of the Nationalist Chinese offshore islands and in subsequent years, refused to build up a nuclear force for Communist China; in 1962, both superpowers pressed their respective factions in Laos to reach a settlement. In many cases, such restraints have also been extended to countries without the camp. Thus, through their efforts, the superpowers have also brought peace to the 1965 Indian-Pakistan war and brought into existence the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Their present restraints on those involved in the Indo-Chinese war and in the Middle East war could be regarded as other cases in point.

4. Perhaps the most important characteristic is that both superpowers appear to be "conservative" powers. Neither of them seeks drastic changes in the basic structure and relations of the actors in the present system, or the distribution of power.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, no more national actors are to face serious problem in the maintenance of their nation-



hood. The Soviet intervention in Hungary and its "invasion" of Czechoslovakia and the U.S. "invasion" of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and its intervention in the Dominican Republic were basically defensive actions, carried out for the purpose of restoring the status quo in those areas.

5. To say that both superpowers have restrained members of their camps is not to say that the two camps are intensively antagonistic and consolidated military and political alliances. "Around 1947, the world was like a huge piece of land in which the cultivated fields were divided into two empires that faced one another across a tall fence."<sup>7</sup> But this is no longer true. The increasing costs of the use of nuclear weapons, the lost appeal of conquest, invasion, and the struggle for territory, the decreasing military threat represented by the Soviet Union, the economic and political recovery of formerly weak allies, together with other developments,<sup>8</sup> have contributed to the relative disintegration of the original alliances in terms of tense military, political and economic confrontations. For example, the siding



of Albania with Communist China, the liberal attitude of Rumania, and the "defections" of Yugoslavia and Communist China have not brought severe disciplinary action or direct military oppression from the Soviet Union. Similarly, Canada's increasing indifferences toward NATO and its consequent partial withdrawal of troops from the Organization have not seriously weakened its relations with the United States. In 1966, a study of the U.N. voting pattern in 1963 indicates that many countries which are supposedly in the U.S. camp also had a record of supporting the Soviet position on many occasions. These countries among others, were Panama, Columbia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Peru, Pakistan, Trinidad.<sup>9</sup> The kinds of support the camp members gave to the superpower in the General Assembly also varied from time to time. For example, while Pakistan supported the U.S. position on "cold war and self-determination issues" at the 12th General Assembly, it supported the Soviet Union's position on the similar issues at the 16th General Assembly.<sup>10</sup> During the period of 1955 and 1967, Pakistan, Iraq, U.A.R., and Cuba have shifted their support between the superpowers drastically (see



Figure 1). During the period of 1955 and 1967, while some countries in the U.S. camp, such as France, Iran and Guatemala have significantly reduced their support to the United States, some in the Soviet camp such as Albania also reduced their support to the Soviet Union to a significant extent (see Figure 1). These phenomena indicate that the two alliance systems have been disintegrating and that tension between the two camps has been relaxing over the past years.

6. There are two other actors which have contributed to the fact that the present system is by no means a "zero-sum game." The first one is the non-aligned actor. The second one is the universal actor.

(a) Non-aligned actors: The non-aligned actors are by and large independent from either camp: they often shift their support between superpowers according to their interests at that particular moment, without having to commit themselves to either superpower (see Figure 2). Nor has either superpower used military force or threatened its use to press these countries in joining its



Years	Iran	Guatemala	Pakistan	France
1947-1955	52.1 Pro-U.S.	61.3 Pro-U.S.	62.7 Pro-U.S.	86.7 Pro-U.S.
1955-1960	98.0 Pro-U.S.	100.0 Pro-U.S.	90.2 Pro-U.S.	96.1 Pro-U.S.
1960-1962	81.2 Pro-U.S.	94.8 Pro-U.S.	73.3 Pro-U.S.	90.0 Pro-U.S.
1963-1967	71.0 Pro-U.S.	60.7 Pro-U.S.	15.6 Pro-U.S.S.R.	56.2 Pro-U.S.

Years	Cuba	Albania	U.A.R.
1947-1955	89.0 Pro-U.S.	Not a member	40.4 Pro-U.S.
1955-1960	90.2 Pro-U.S.	100.0 Pro-U.S.S.R.	41.2 Pro-U.S.S.R.
1960-1962	97.3 Pro-U.S.S.R.	98.7 Pro-U.S.S.R.	48.1 Pro-U.S.S.R.
1963-1967	100.0 Pro-U.S.S.R.	90.6 Pro-U.S.S.R.	71.9 Pro-U.S.S.R.

\* "The indexes used in this study are very similar to the Rice index of cohesion. . . . If a given state cast 30 Pro-U.S. votes, 20 pro-communist votes, but abstained 50 times, its Rice index of cohesion would be 20% pro-U.S. (60% minus 40%). This study would award it a pro-U.S. stance of only 10% (30 minus 20 divided by 100). Absences are disregarded here. . . ."

Source: Frederick H. Gareau, The Cold War 1947 to 1967: A Quantitative Study, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 6 (Denver, Colorado: The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1969), 7, 24, 36, 55, 63.



Figure 2

Details of the Cold War Voting in the United Nations

Years	India	Iraq	Cambodia
1947-1955	17.0 Pro-U.S.	62.2 Pro-U.S.	Not a member
1955-1960	44.9 Pro-U.S.S.R.	21.6 Pro-U.S.	3.9 Pro-U.S.S.R.
1960-1962	30.0 Pro-U.S.S.R.	58.7 Pro-U.S.S.R.	33.3 Pro-U.S.S.R.
1963-1967	3.1 Pro-U.S.	78.1 Pro-U.S.S.R.	88.0 Pro-U.S.S.R.

Years	Mauritania	Togo
1947-1955	Not a member	Not a member
1955-1960	Not a member	Not a member
1960-1962	35.2 Pro-U.S.	15.6 Pro-U.S.
1963-1967	66.7 Pro-U.S.S.R.	90.6 Pro-U.S.

Source: Frederick H. Gareau, The Cold War 1947-to 1967: A Quantitative Study  
(Denver, Colorado: University of Denver, 1969), 36, 62.



alliance system or camp. Thus in the United Nations, non-aligned countries such as Congo (Brazzaville), Senegal, Mauretania, Burundi, and to a less extent, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Chad, Gabon, Central African Republic, Haiti, India, Burma, Libya and Jordan, have given support to both superpowers<sup>11</sup> (see Figure 2) have given support to both superpowers. Such non-aligned policy has tended not only to ensure a country's independence, but also, to keep the country out of larger conflicts and at the same time reduce the danger of involving the superpowers in a local conflict.<sup>12</sup> As shall be discussed below, within the framework of the United Nations, the non-aligned countries might even contribute to the easing of tensions in the system.

(b) Universal actor, i.e., the United Nations: Since its foundation, the United Nations has to some extent, contributed to the easing of tensions in the international system. Its peace-keeping activities have served as a kind of "preventive diplomacy" or "preventive security" agency<sup>13</sup> to maintain peace in many areas and thus contribute to



the prevention of further military antagonisms among countries in the international system (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). It is in these activities that the non-aligned actors have shown their specific significance. The roles played by India in the Korean war, and other activities such as United Nations Operation in the Congo are cases in point. Of course, in a world in which the superpowers are still predominantly the major national actors, all these UN activities and the contribution of the non-aligned actors probably would not have been possible without at least some consent from the superpowers. But at the same time, the U.N.'s and the non-aligned actors' services are also indispensable. As Inis L. Claude, Jr. points out quite illuminatively,

preventive diplomacy requires not only that the great powers consent to be served, but also that the uncommitted states consent to serve. The conception of a U.N. operating to assist the major powers in avoiding mortal conflict by neutralizing conflict zones. . . .

The record thus far suggests an encouraging willingness on the part of the uncommitted states to undertake the delicate responsibilities and onerous burdens of preventive diplomacy. . . . 14



Figure 3

Disputes referred to UN

1945-1965

Period	UN Settles or Helps Settle
1945-1947	Azerbaijan Balkans Corfu Channel Indonesia
1948-1951	Korea Withdrawal of Republic of China troops from Burma
1956-1960	Suez war Lebanon/Jordan unrest Nicaragua/Honduras border Thai/Cambodia border
1961-1965	Congo West Irian Bizerta Southern Rhodesia Aden/Yemen border Cambodia/South Vietnam (U.S.) Stanleyville air rescue India-Pakistan war

Source: Ernst B. Haas, Collective Security and the  
Future International System, (Denver, Colorado:  
University of Denver , 1968), 46.



Figure 4

Disputes Involving Hostilities Referred to UN

1945-1965

Period	UN Succeeds in Maintaining Truce or Stopping Hostilities
1945-1947	Indonesia Kashmir Palestine
1948-1951	Korea
1952-1955	None
1956-1960	Suez war Lebanon/Jordan unrest
1961-1965	Congo West Irian Cyprus civil war India-Pakistan war

Source: Ernst B. Haas, Collective Security and the  
Future International System (Denver, Colorado:  
University of Denver, 1968), 47.



The above discussion of the characteristics of the present international system, (i.e., the nuclear deterrence and nuclear stalemate between the superpowers; their restraints of other countries in the system; the disintegration of the two alliances systems and the reduction of tension between the two camps; the reduction of incompatibility and the increase of accomodation among countries as a result of the joint efforts of the superpowers, the United Nations and the non-aligned countries) all contribute to the moderation and stability in the present international system. The present system is by and large stable which is to say that there have not been drastic changes in the basic structure, relations, and characteristics of the actors in the system. Stability is clearly a relative concept whose definition is very elusive. According to General Systems Theory, a system is "open" or subject to inputs that may in some manner upset it. It has a tendency to maintain itself in a "steady state" or "stable condition", which does not mean that it is in a state of "perfect equilibrium," but a state in which its basic structure and relationships is maintained despite upsetting inputs



or withinputs.<sup>15</sup>

There are a number of factors which could lead to drastic changes in the present international system. These factors among others, are the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international system, the erosion of present nuclear stalemate and nuclear deterrence in the system, and a rapid strategic nuclear arm race between the superpowers. Thus, how a new major nuclear power would affect the present system will depend on whether or not the emergence of that power would strengthen some or all of these destabilizing factors. Much will in turn depend on the foreign policy objectives of the new nuclear power. Therefore, a distinction should be made between countries whose foreign policy objectives are offensive and revolutionary on the one hand and defensive and conservative on the other.

Much depends on the foreign policy context (Do the weapons serve a defensive vision and strategy, or a revisionist or revolutionary vision and strategy?)<sup>16</sup>

A nuclear country whose foreign policy objectives are revolutionary and offensive would not be satisfied with the status quo and may well seek to change it



with its newly acquired nuclear weapons.

It has been prophesied that many will be "conscious antagonists of a system of domestic and international order they regard as bad or immoral." When they get weapons they will seek to change this "bad and immoral" international system into one more to their liking.<sup>17</sup>

For example, a new nuclear power with revolutionary policy objectives may be tempted to launch a nuclear attack on its enemies to win an immediate victory or it may merely apply a "hostage" or "blackmail" strategy to force its enemies to submit to its will.

It is in the light of this consideration that the following chapters will examine whether or not Communist China as an emerging nuclear power will affect the international system and if so, to what extent. While Communist China's impact on the international system may be analyzed from at least two perspectives: (a) the ends and means of its foreign policy and (b) the fact of its possession of nuclear weapons (i.e., it's just another nuclear power), the emphasis in the following chapters will be on the former perspective.



## Notes (Chapter I)

1. Hans Thirring, "Can We Sleep Soundly in the Shadow of the Hydrogen Bomb?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. II (February, 1955), 59-61.

2. Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: F.W. Praeger, 1965), 237.  
See also Thomas C. Schelling, "The Threat that Leaves Something to Chance," in his The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 187-204.

3. See Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War, 233-234.  
See also Ciro Elliott Zoppo, "Nuclear Technology, Multipolarity, and International Stability," World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 4 (July, 1966), 585. See also George Schwarzenberger, "Beyond Power Politics?" The Year Book of World Affairs 1965, 224.

4. Ciro Elliott Zoppo, "Nuclear Technology, Multipolarity, and International Stability," 585.

5. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Has Atomic War Really Become Impossible?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January, 1956), 7-9.

6. These drastic changes may or may not be carried out by direct military force.

7. Stanley Hoffmann, "Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics," A World of Nuclear Powers? ed. Alastair Buchan (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 93.

8. See Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 238ff.

9. See Bruce M. Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," American Political Science Review, (June, 1966), 327ff.



10. See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965)

11. Bruce M. Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," American Political Science Review (June, 1966), 327ff.

12. See Earnst Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism," Neutralism and Non-alignment, ed. by Laurence Martin (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1962)

13. Inis L. Claude, Jr. Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random, 1964), 285ff.

14. Ibid., 302

15. For further discussion on systems theory, see for example, Stanley Hoffmann, "International System and International Law," World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1 (October, 1961), 207; David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965); Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, Science Edition (New York, N.Y.: John Wiley, 1964); Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Co., 1966);

16. Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War, 248.

17. Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable, (New York, N.Y.: Horizon Press, 1962), 223.



## CHAPTER II

### COMMUNIST CHINA'S BASIC FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

#### Traditional Territorial National Interests

Throughout its history, China has regarded itself as the center of the world. The term "Chung-kuo" (China) itself stands for "Middle Kingdom," or "Central Kingdom," which conveys "the sense of a large universe revolving around a primary, directing force," represented by China.<sup>1</sup> Proud of their brilliant culture and historical heritage, the Chinese have regarded their homeland as "the center of the civilized world." The large territory, population, common language, and Confucian political, ethical, and social values they share, reinforce their "great power images."<sup>2</sup> With the possible exception of India and Japan, no country in Asia could be compared with China, either politically, militarily, or culturally. The military as well as cultural superiority and prosperity of the Han (206 B.C.-189 A.D.), T'ang (618-905 A.D.), Ming (1368-1643 A.D.), and early Ching (1644-1700 A.D.) dynasties further reinforced the Chinese "Middle



Kingdom" assumption and China's presumed influence in Asia. Consequently, China had established around itself a system of tributary states,<sup>3</sup> which were expected to be submissive and to pay at least some tribute to China. At any sign of hostility on their part, China was quite prepared to use force to cope with them. China's expeditions to Burma, Vietnam (Annam), Korea, and many northern areas were cases in point. Although these tributary states, for instance Korea at the time of the T'ang dynasty, had once been conquered by China, they were seldom occupied by the Chinese. During the Ming dynasty, there were as many as thirty-eight tributary states, including Japan, Nepal, Annam, and Korea. Through the tribute system and constant display of its military might, China not only found guarantees of its security, but also built up and maintained a loose "Chinese Empire" which covered most parts of East Asia, stretching from the Pamirs to Pusan,<sup>4</sup> (see Figure 5), until after the early Ching dynasty, although its relative influence in the area varied from period to period.



## China

### The World Order--Traditional Model




Figure 5



## China: The World Order--Traditional Model

(1) Area 1: This area contained the eighteen provinces, the traditional territories under China's complete control throughout its history and was "the hub" or the "core" of China.<sup>5</sup> It extended from the Great Wall in the north to Indochina in the south, and from the western plateaus to the "East China Sea," covering about forty percent of modern China. It presently supports eighty-seven percent of the Chinese population.

(2) Area 2: This area<sup>6</sup> covered the remaining sixty percent of modern China, including Tibet, Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, the off-shore islands, and many tributary states, such as Korea and Annam. The Chinese regarded both Area 1 and Area 2 as their vital national interest areas and therefore were quite determined to defend them at all costs.

(3) Area 3: This area<sup>7</sup> covered most tributary states along the Chinese border, such as the Liu-ch'iu (Ryukyo) Islands, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, the Himalayan States, Afghanistan, Malaya, part of Borneo, and for a brief period, Japan. While



all these states were regarded as within China's sphere of interest, they were not as vitally important as the first two areas and China seldom intervened in their domestic affairs.

(4) Area 4: This area<sup>8</sup> covered the rest of the countries in Asia, including India, Pakistan, New Guinea, Indonesia, and other countries, such as Iran. Although China was concerned with these countries, its influence on them was limited.

(5) Area 5: This area<sup>9</sup> covered countries in Europe, America, Africa, etc. China regarded these countries as "barbaric" and had never treated them as equals.

Of these areas, area 1, area 2, and area 3 were especially regarded as within the "traditional frontiers" of China. In fact, until after the end of early Ching dynasty, China enjoyed its hegemony within these frontiers.

However, during the past one hundred and fifty years, China's "Empire" and its hegemony in Asia completely collapsed. Threatened by rifles gunboats of the western countries, China was forced



to sign many "unequal treaties." According to these treaties, China agreed to indemnify such countries as Great Britain, France and Japan a large amount of money and to open almost all important Chinese ports to these countries. Many Chinese territories were ceded to foreign countries (see Figure 6). Furthermore, the "spheres of interest" of these foreign countries were expanded to include other areas in China. For example, France took control of Kwang-chow Bay; Britain took control of Weihaiwei and the Yangtze River Area; and Russia took control of Port Arthur. Within their spheres of interest these countries had complete jurisdiction. They were for example, free to build railroads and military bases and to exploit natural resources.

During this period, China also lost most of its tributary states. Britain took control of Burma, France took control of Indochina, and Russia and Japan took control of Manchuria and Korea.

It is because of these developments, that a feeling of humiliation and frustration has been cultivated in the minds of the Chinese people. Thus,



Figure 6

Chinese Territories Ceded to Foreign Countries

Date Ceded	Area, in square Kilometers	Area	Ceded to
1689	240,000	North side Khingan Mountains	Russia
1727	100,000	Lower Selenga Valley	Russia
1842	83	Hong Kong	United Kingdom
1858	480,000	North of Heilungkiang	Russia
1858	8	<b>Kowloon</b>	United Kingdom
1860	344,000	East of Ussuri River	Russia
1864	900,000	North of Lake Balkhash	Russia
1879	2,386	Liuchiu Islands	Japan
1882-3	21,000	Lower Ili Valley	Russia
1883	20,000	Irtysk Valley east of Lake Zaysan	Russia
1884	9,000	Upper Koksol Valley	Russia
1894	122,400	West of the Upper Salween	United Kingdom
1894	91,300	West of the Upper Yangtze	United Kingdom
1895	35,842	Taiwan	Japan
1895	127	Pescadores	Japan
1897	760	The edge of Burma	United Kingdom
1897	2,300	The edge of Burma	United Kingdom

Source: Hou Ming-chiu, Chen Erh-shiu, and Lu Chen, General Geography of China, 1946, cited in G.B. Gressey, Land of the 500 Million (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955), 39.



Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of Republic China, said:

We are the poorest and weakest country in the world, occupying the lowest position in world affairs; people of other countries are the carving knife and the serving dish while we are the fish and the meat.<sup>10</sup>

Today, the Chinese still remember vividly their glorious history and their traditional dominant role in Asia. The concept of "Middle Kingdom" is still quite real in their minds. Thus, President Chiang Kai-shek of Nationalist China maintained in 1943 that the Western countries and the unequal treaties they imposed on China had "not only rendered China no longer a state, but also made the Chinese people no longer a nation. They completely destroyed our nationhood, and our sense of honor and shame was lost." He also maintained that the Western countries had taken many territories from China and vowed to recover them.

In regard to the living space essential for the nation's existence, the territory of the Chinese state is determined by the requirements for national survival and by the limits of Chinese cultural bonds. Thus, in the territory of China a hundred years ago, comprising more than ten million square kilometers, there was not a single district that was not essential to the survival of the Chinese nation and none that was not permeated by our culture. Thus the people as a whole must regard this as a



national humiliation, and not until all lost territories have been recovered can we relax our efforts to wipe out this humiliation and save ourselves from destruction.<sup>11</sup>

Mao Tse-tung similarly claimed in 1939 that "the imperialist powers have taken away many Chinese dependent states and part of her territories."

The most important ones he mentioned were: Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Pescadores, Port Arthur, Burma, Nepal, Hong Kong, Annam, and Macao.<sup>12</sup>

In 1949, he promised that "our nation will never again be an insulted nation."<sup>13</sup> In 1960, he declared that "we will strive for eight more years, perhaps ten years or a while longer. Then we will let the world see what kind of people we Chinese are."<sup>14</sup>


Accordingly, both the Chinese Communist and Nationalist leaders share similar views toward China's past and future: its traditional superiority and its future great power status. As Hans J. Morgenthau points out:

It would be futile to expect that the new generation will be more accommodating than is the old one when it comes to the restoration of China's traditional domain in Asia. In this respect, Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek see eye to eye, and so must Mao Tse-tung and his successor, whoever he may be.<sup>15</sup>

One might conclude then that the "ideal" world order viewed from Peking is this (see Figure 7);



The World Order: Current Model





## China: The World Order--Current Model

(1) Area I: The modern area I includes the eighteen provinces, Manchuria, Taiwan, Sinkiang, and Tibet. Territories within Area I are regarded as China's vital national interest areas and must be defended at all cost. Thus the "recovery" or "liberation" of Taiwan remains one of its most important objectives.<sup>16</sup> Also, China considers it vital that Tibet remain as an integral part of China. A third vital national interest area consists of the territories lost to Russia which should at least be renegotiated if not regained or resettled. The territories include the Trans-Amur territories, the Soviet Maritime province, the Port of Vladivostok, and Sakhalin Island.<sup>17</sup>

(2) Area II: This area<sup>18</sup> covers the bordering areas of China except South Korea and South Vietnam as well as Outer Mongolia. In this area, Communist China expects to establish its hegemony and if possible direct control. It is also regarded by China as an essential national interest area. Communist China's intervention in the Korean war and its deep concern about the Vietnamese war are cases in point.



China probably wants Outer Mongolia to be its very close ally if not part of China again. In 1936, Mao Tse-tung said that Outer Mongolia would eventually automatically become a part of the "Chinese Federation."<sup>19</sup> Chiang Kai-shek shares a similar view.<sup>20</sup> Recently, Communist China was annoyed because of the Soviet Union's "turning Outer Mongolia into its colony and military base."<sup>21</sup>

(3) Area III: This area covers the rest of Asia, including South Vietnam, South Korea, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Nepal, the Himalayan States, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, India, Ceylon, and possibly Afghanistan. Countries in this area are expected to be friendly towards China. They are at best expected to consult China on all major foreign issues and at the least, not to be allies of a hostile country, such as the United States. Foreign Military force such as the U.S. bases in these countries are highly inimical to Chinese interests and their removal is vital. Nor should these countries themselves pose a threat to China. The recent close relations between the United States and Japan, and Japan's growing military strength have therefore alarmed



Communist China. After accusing the "Japanese reactionaries" of carrying out aggression and expansion in Southeast Asia in a bid to re-establish their spheres of influence there,"<sup>22</sup> Communist China claimed that "it is a plain fact that the arms expansion and war preparations by Japan's reactionaries are spearheaded against China."<sup>23</sup>

(4) Area IV: This area comprises the rest of the world. Communist China's geographical and political aim in this area remains uncertain. Although it has been claimed that China would sooner or later adopt an expansionist policy toward this area,<sup>24</sup> our discussion above does not seem to support such a conclusion. In fact, the Chinese people seem to have content with their "living space" since the time of the T'ang dynasty.<sup>25</sup> Thus, what Communist China would do in this area insofar as its traditional territorial national interests are concerned [vis-a-vis its ideological interests to be discussed below], can be answered only by future developments.

### Ideology

In addition to the factor of traditional territorial national interests outlined above, there is



another important factor affecting Communist China's foreign policy objectives. This other factor is ideology.

Communist China's ideology, Maoism, consists of Marxist-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought (based upon Mao's experience in the Chinese revolution and his absorption of traditional Chinese tactics and strategy).<sup>26</sup> In its ideology, Communist China identifies three contradictions among the countries of the world:

(1) the contradiction between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp,

(2) the contradiction between oppressed countries and imperialist countries, and

(3) the contradiction among imperialist countries.<sup>27</sup>

According to the three above mentioned contradictions, there are three types of countries:

(1) communist or socialist countries,

(2) capitalist or imperialist countries, and

(3) countries between these two camps.

In the Communist Chinese view, there can be



no relaxation between the socialist countries and the imperialist countries.

Numerous facts show that, in the struggle against imperialism, relaxation that is won through struggle is a genuine relaxation, while relaxation brought by capitulation is a false relaxation. The so-called relaxation now appearing between the United States and the Soviet Union is only a transient and superficial phenomenon and a false relaxation.<sup>28</sup>

Therefore, as long as there are imperialist countries in the world, there can be no peace.

It is our view that imperialism is the source of modern wars and that U.S. imperialism is the main force of aggression and war. Unless a resolute struggle is waged against the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war, defense of world peace is completely out of the question.<sup>29</sup>

The countries between the two camps exist in a zone called the "intermediate zone", first mentioned by Mao in 1946,<sup>30</sup> and was sub-divided into two further zones in 1964. One of these, the "first intermediate zone", included the independent countries and those striving for independence in Asia, Africa, Latin America. The other zone, called the "second intermediate zone", included the whole of Western Europe, Oceania, Canada, and many other countries.<sup>31</sup> These countries were permitted to remain neutral between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp,



but will eventually have to make a choice between the two camps.

In the view of Communist China, "pacifist neutralism", "a third road", as well as "sitting on the fence", are camouflages, and are therefore not permissible.<sup>32</sup> Thus, the Communist Chinese have indicated in their Bulletin of Activities, that co-existence with countries in the "intermediate zone" is merely a transitional form; socialism will eventually be realized throughout the world.<sup>33</sup>

Communist China further claims that the only way to transform non-socialist countries into socialist countries is by revolution:

The proletariat would, of course, prefer to gain power by peaceful means. But abundant historical evidence indicates that the reactionary classes never give up power voluntarily.<sup>34</sup>

Therefore, Mao pointed out, revolutions are inevitable.

Revolutions and revolutionary wars are inevitable in class society and. . . without them, it is impossible to accomplish any leap in social development and to overthrow the reactionary ruling classes and therefore, impossible for the people to win political power.<sup>35</sup>



The areas in which to carry out revolution immediately, according to the Chinese revolutionary strategy, are countries in the "first intermediate zone." These countries, because of the frustration and humiliation they have experienced during the colonial period and the enormous social, economic, and political problems they face, are "the storm-center of world revolution."<sup>36</sup> For these reasons, Communist China claims that revolution is ripe in these countries in the "intermediate zone."

After revolution has been completed in these areas, the next step would be the "encirclement" of other non-socialist countries.

The concept of "encirclement" was originally designed by Mao for China's own internal revolution in which the peasant class was the most important element. Rural areas are the base areas that will be used to surround the cities in order to complete the revolution.<sup>37</sup> The same strategy is to be applied to international revolution as well. The countries in the first intermediate zone are regarded as "the rural areas of the world", while other countries, including those in the "second intermediate zone", are



regarded as part of the "cities of the world."

As Lin Piao, the officially designated successor of Mao, said in 1965:

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world." Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majorities of the world's population. The socialist countries should regard it as their internationalist duty to support the people's revolutionary struggle in Asia, Africa and Latin America.<sup>38</sup>

In fact, as early as 1954, Chou En-lai, Communist China's premier, in a report to a special conference of world communist parties held in Moscow, claimed:

Southeast Asia, India and Japan are primary targets. The next step is to reach North Africa through the Middle East and the Suez Canal. The third step is to push toward the Sahara from North Africa. Australia is included in the fourth step of the plan.<sup>39</sup>

According to Maoism, "once the capitalist nations in Europe are severed from Asia and Africa, economic



debacle will surely occur on the European mainland. Then the capitulation of Europe and a universal economic bankruptcy and industrial upheaval can be expected."<sup>40</sup>

According to Mao, the most important element of a successful revolution in these countries is armed force: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."<sup>41</sup>

Experience in the class struggle in the era of imperialism teaches us that it is only by the power of the gun that the working class and labouring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords. In this sense we may say that with guns the whole world can be transformed.<sup>42</sup>

He also points out that:

The seizure of power by armed force and the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally for China and for all other countries.<sup>43</sup>

Therefore, the Communist Chinese define "revolution" as "an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another." Only through armed struggle "can the proletariat, the people, and the Communist party gain their place in a country and win victory for the revolution."<sup>44</sup>



The strategy of armed struggle is applicable to international revolution as well. The Communist Chinese claim that the task of combatting imperialism and its agents internationally is far from completed.<sup>45</sup> They maintain that the imperialists would not collapse by themselves. Instead, they will use armed force to suppress the revolution. The Communist Chinese also maintain that the imperialists are "a bunch of creatures that will submit to force but never listen to persuasion."<sup>46</sup> Therefore, wars of national liberation or revolutionary wars by means of armed struggle and violence are inevitable. Only through the complete elimination of imperialist neighbors can socialist countries be really secure and safe.<sup>47</sup>

#### Traditional Territorial National Interest and Ideology: Their Relative Importance

It has long been debated whether national interest or ideology is the most decisive factor in the formulation of Communist China's foreign policy. At one extreme, some observers claim that ideology is not important. For instance, Hans J. Morgenthau maintains:

Communism only adds a new dynamic dimension to the means by which those policies are to



be achieved. In other words, the fundamental fact in Asia is not that China has a communist government but that she has resumed her traditional role as the pre-dominant power in Asia.<sup>48</sup>

Similarly Walter B. Wentz claims that "communism provides simply a rationalization of national objectives which existed centuries before the rise of Mao Tse-tung."<sup>49</sup>

Nevertheless, the validity of this line of argument is questionable. Communist China's zeal in world revolution and communism has constantly and significantly influenced its policy. For example, if Mainland China were still under the control of the Nationalist government, it probably would not pay as much attention to the revolutions in countries in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, as the Communist government does. In many cases, such as its policy of encouraging revolution in Japan in 1958 and its antagonism toward the Japanese government, ideological convictions apparently have led Communist China to formulate some mistaken policies.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, the importance of Communist China's ideology cannot be ignored. As A. Doak Barnett points out:



It is true that the Chinese Communists are pragmatic in interpreting their ideology to take advantage of concrete situations and are flexible in formulating their day-to-day tactics. But to underrate the importance of ideology as a determinant of Peking's long-range policy, or to argue that ideology is no more than a cloak for Chinese national interests, would be a serious mistake. The Chinese Communists are motivated by a genuine revolutionary zeal which is probably stronger than that of the present leaders in the Soviet Union. Ideology greatly influences their conceptions of China's national interests, and the Communist belief in world revolution definitely impels them to project their influence beyond China's borders.<sup>51</sup>

Many well-known scholars, such as Morton H. Halperin, Dwight H. Perkins, and Alastair Buchan, share a similar view. They agree that "Mao Tse-tung and his associates "probably give a higher priority to ideology than their Soviet counterparts do."<sup>52</sup>

In contrast to those sponsors of "national interest as the sole factor" theory, other maintain that ideology is the sole motivating force in the formulation of Communist China's foreign policy. For example, H. Arthur Steiner, and Franz Michael<sup>53</sup> tend to argue that the pursuit of international communism and the mission to spread Marxist-Leninism throughout the world are the decisive factors in Communist China's invasion of India and its close relations with Pakistan, (a member of the U.S. led SEATO and CENTO). Thus it



seems quite legitimate to say:

If we think of China only as a Communist power and overlook nationalism, we are likely to misunderstand a lot of their moves.<sup>54</sup>

The above discussion indicates that both national and ideological interests are important and both have played important roles in deciding Communist China's foreign policy objectives. As Abraham M. Halpern significantly points out:

It is sometimes asked whether Chinese policy is based on ideology or on national interest. Neither concept is altogether clear, and the two are not mutually exclusive. Communist ideology is not pure philosophy but also political analysis and strategy. . . . While. . . a drive toward great power status has been a constant motive of the C.P.R. [Communist China], it is a motive that has not always pulled in an opposite direction from ideology. . . . In a number of situations the Chinese have had options and. . . their choices have reflected both their great power ambitions and their sense of a world revolutionary mission.<sup>55</sup>

Similarly, A. S. Whiting maintains that both ideological and national interests are important to Communist China. He points out:

The present rulers of China are Chinese. They have lived there, with few exceptions, during most of their past. The environment within which they operate is essentially the same as that which prevailed in China for the previous century. At the same time, they



view that environment through Communist lenses. The elite possesses a highly articulated ideology which it consciously proclaims as the basis of behavior: the Marxist-Leninist creed of Communism.<sup>56</sup>

Robert A. Scalapino, A. Doak Barnett, Harold C. Hinton, Abraham M. Halpern, Morton Halperin,<sup>57</sup> and many other well-known writers share the same conclusion.

Both Chinese ideology and national interests are significant factors affecting policy and neither of them can be ignored. In many cases, both factors are intertwined and a distinction is very difficult to make. The present Sino-American and Sino-Soviet conflicts are cases in point. In both cases, differences between the adversaries on points of ideology as well as on items of national interest not only caused conflict but also tended to reinforce each other, thus aggravating the conflicts.<sup>58</sup>



## Notes (Chapter II)

<sup>1</sup>Robert A. Scalapino, "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy," Current Scene: Developments in Mainland China, Vol. VI, No. 13, (August 1, 1968), 2.

<sup>2</sup>Harold Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), 2.

<sup>3</sup>For discussion in this regard, see for example John K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 6 (June, 1941), 135-246.

<sup>4</sup>For similar models, see Norton Ginsburg, "On the Chinese Perception of A World Order," China in Crisis, Vol. 2, ed. Tang Tsou (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 73-91; John K. Fairbank, "China's World Order," Encounter, Vol. 27 (December, 1966), 14-5. See also, "The Geography of Mainland China: A Concise Sketch" Current Scene, Vol. VII, No. 17 (September 1, 1969), 1-21.

<sup>5</sup>See "The Geography of Mainland China: A Concise Sketch," 1, 4.

<sup>6</sup>See John K. Fairbank, "China's World Order," 14. With slight variation, see also Norton Ginsburg "On the Chinese perception of A World Order", 76ff,

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>See Norton Ginsburg, "On the Chinese Perception of A World Order," 76-91

<sup>9</sup>Ibid. See also John K. Fairbank, "China's World Order," 19.

<sup>10</sup>Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I (Three People's Principles) (Taipei, Taiwan: Cheng Chung, 1954), 6.

<sup>11</sup>Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory (New York, N.Y.: Roy Publication, 1947), 34, 79.



<sup>12</sup> Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," December, 15, 1939 version, Current Background, No. 135 (November 10, 1951), cited by A. Doak Barnett in his Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to American Policy (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1960), 79.

<sup>13</sup> Mao Tse-tung, speech on September 21, 1949 to the People's Political Consultative Conference, China Digest (October 5, 1949), cited by A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., 67

<sup>14</sup> Quoted by Robert S. Elegant in his The Centre of the World: Communism and the Mind of China (London: Methuen, 1963), x.

<sup>15</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, "The United States and China," China in Crisis, Vol. 2, 95.

<sup>16</sup> For Communist China's determination to "liberate" Taiwan, see for example, Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), No. 9 (August 27, 1969), 24-28.

<sup>17</sup> For details, see W.E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-5," China Quarterly, No. 25 (January-March, 1966), 28-30. See also: "Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China-Refutation of the Soviet Government's Statement of June 13, 1969" October 8, 1969, Peking Review, No. 41 (October 10, 1969). For a map with detailed illustration, see People's Daily, Kwan-ming Daily, October 8, 1969.

<sup>18</sup> Norton Ginsburg, "On the Chinese Perception of A World Order," 76ff.

<sup>19</sup> Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, revised edition (New York: Garden City Publishing Co., 1939), 88-89.

<sup>20</sup> See Chiang Kai-shen, China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory, 77-78.

<sup>21</sup> "Statement of the Government of People's Republic of China" May 24, 1969, Peking Review No. 22 (May 30, 1969), 7.

<sup>22</sup> "Japanese Reactionaries' Pipe Dream," Peking Review, No. 38 (September 19, 1969), 27.



<sup>23</sup>"Japanese Reactionaries Feverishly Push Policy of Armaments Expansion and War Preparations" Peking Review, No. 47 (November 21, 1969), 28.

<sup>24</sup>See for example, Tomokatsu Matsumara "How Likely A Head-on Collision?" Atlas, Vol. 15, No. 2 (February 1968), 38. Matsumara is a leading Japanese expert on China.

<sup>25</sup>C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1964), 18-9.

<sup>26</sup>Mao's traditional thinking is derived from many Chinese classics including Sun Tsu Ping-fa (A Treatise on War), Shui Hu Chuan (All Men Are Brothers), San Kuo Yuan Yee (Tales of the Three Kingdoms), Tse Chih Tung Chieh (The Mirror of History for Wise Rulers);

<sup>27</sup>Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," June 14, 1963, Polemic of the General Line of the International Communist Movement (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 24.

<sup>28</sup>"Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3," August 15, 1963 People of the World, Unite , for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 24.

<sup>29</sup>"Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 21," September 1, 1963, People of the World . . . , 49

<sup>30</sup>Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. VI, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 97-101

<sup>31</sup>"On Mao Tse-tung's Talk with a Group of Japanese Socialists," Pravda, September 2, 1964, reprinted in International Affairs (Moscow), No. 10, (October 1964), 80-85



<sup>32</sup>Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship, July, 1949, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1952), 10.

<sup>33</sup>"Source Material: Several Important Problems concerning the Current International Situation," No. 17 (April 25, 1961), Bulletin of Activities of Kung-tso T'ung-hsu (Work Correspondances), in The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, ed. J. Chester Cheng (Stanford, California: Stanford University, 1966), 481.

<sup>34</sup>"The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism, Eighth Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," editorial, People's Daily, March 31, 1964, reprinted in Polemic of the General Line of the International Communist Movement, 367.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>"More on the Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us," Peking Review, Nos. 10 & 11 (March 15, 1963), 16-7.

<sup>37</sup>See Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," Peking Review, No. 36, (September 3, 1965), 9-31.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 24.

<sup>39</sup>Quoted in Ting Kuang-hua, "Africa under Peiping's Infiltration and Aggression," Chinese Communist Affairs Bi-Monthly, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April, 1965), 16. For similar views expressed by the Communist Chinese, see also "Source Material: Several Important Problems Concerning the Current International Situation", 480-487. See also Tung Chi-ping and Humphrey Evans, The Thought Revolution (New York; N.Y.: Coward-McCann, 1966), 223.

<sup>40</sup>"Africa under Peiping's Infiltration and Aggression," 16.

<sup>41</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," November 6, 1938, Selected Military Writings, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 242, 269.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 272-3.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 267.

<sup>44</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "Report of An Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," Selected Works, Vol. 1 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955), 27. See also his Selected Works, Vol. II (Peking: People's Press, 1961), 600.



<sup>45</sup>"Apologists on Neo-Colonialism, Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," editorial, People's Daily, October 22, 1963.

<sup>46</sup>Sung Tu, "Answers to Readers' Questions on War and Peace," China Youth (Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien), No. 4 (February 16, 1960), quoted in Vidya Prakash Dutt, China and the World, 88.

<sup>47</sup>Peaceful Co-existence--Two Diametrically Opposed Politics (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 5.

<sup>48</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Vietnam Crisis and China," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June, 1965), 27. For similar views, see also his Vietnam and the United States (New York, N.Y.: Public Affairs Press, 1965) and "Vietnam: Shadow and Substance," The New York Times Review of Books, September 16, 1965, 3-5.

<sup>49</sup>Walter B. Wentz, Nuclear Proliferation, (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), 50.

<sup>50</sup>For details, see Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control. (Cambridge, Mass.: Frederick A. Praeger for Harvard University, 1965), 17ff.

<sup>51</sup>A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, 68.

<sup>52</sup>Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control, 1. For similar view, see Alastair Buchan, "An Asian Balance of Power," Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. XII, (August 1966), 272.

<sup>53</sup>Franz H. Michael and George E. Taylor, The Far East in the Modern World (New York, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964); H. Arthur Steiner, "The Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy," American Journal of International Law, Vol. XLIV, No. 1 (January, 1950); Richard L. Walker, The Continuing Struggles: Communist China and the Free World (New York, N.Y.: Athene, 1958).

<sup>54</sup>Richard Harris, "China and the World," International Affairs (London), Vol. 35, No. 2 (April, 1959), 162.



<sup>55</sup>Albraham M. Halpern, "China in the Postwar World," China Quarterly, No. 21 (January/March, 1965), 43

<sup>56</sup>Allen S. Whiting, "Foreign Policy of Communist China" in Foreign Policy in World Politics, ed. Roy C. Macridis (Englewood Cliffs, N.H.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 296.

<sup>57</sup>Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China" Foreign Policies in A World of Change, ed. Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Sons, 1963), 549-590.

--- , "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy," Current Scene, Vol. VI, No. 13 (August 1, 1968), 1-15.

Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics.

A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia.

<sup>58</sup>A study of the causes of the Sino-Soviet conflict involves the consideration of both the ideological and national interests of Communist China. Ideologically, Communist China is convinced that the Soviet Union's recent "revisionist" policy towards the "imperialist countries," notably the United States, has weakened the cause of communism. The Soviet Union's reluctance to support revolutionary wars is also regarded by Communist China as a betrayal of "socialism." At the same time, the border disputes between the two countries involve their vital national interests. In addition, Communist China has been discontented with the Soviet Union's lack of support in cases such as the Quemoy crisis in 1958. Furthermore the Soviet aids for India during the Sino-Indian war annoyed and disheartened Communist China. The Soviet Union's decision not to help Communist China become an independent nuclear country has also been regarded by Communist China as detrimental to the Chinese national interest. The Sino-Soviet conflict involves more problems and differences than these; but these examples may indicate the "mixed" nature of the conflict. Similarly, in the Sino-American conflict, in addition to Communist China's ideological hostility towards "imperialists," the American "occupation" of Taiwan and its military bases around China are regarded as threats to China's vital national interests. It would therefore be a mistake to try to trace the causes of these conflicts to either ideology or national interest alone.



## CHAPTER III

### COMMUNIST CHINA'S BASIC NUCLEAR STRATEGY

As mentioned earlier, many factors in the present international system, notably the nuclear deterrence and restraints among countries have contributed to the maintenance of stability in the system. Neither superpower seeks to change the basic structure, relations and characteristics of the international system drastically. Communist China appears to realize that as long as the superpowers, virtually "monopolize" the world's nuclear weapons, its objectives would be very difficult, if not impossible, to realize. Thus, as early as 1963, Communist China had already said:

There are more than 130 countries in the world. All countries, big or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, are equal. It is absolutely impermissible for two or three countries to brandish their nuclear weapons at will, issue orders and commands, and lord it over in the world as self-ordained nuclear overlords, while the overwhelming majority of countries are expected to kneel and obey orders meekly, as if they were nuclear slaves.<sup>1</sup>

It then said that "it appears that the Soviet leaders want to have a monopoly not only of nuclear weapons



but also of the right to speak on the question of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> In 1964, Communist China claimed that the policy of nuclear blackmail adopted by the U.S. imperialists was based on the existing nuclear monopoly and that when that monopoly was broken, the U.S. policy of nuclear blackmail would be of no avail.<sup>3</sup>

From what has been discussed so far, it can be supposed that the Communist Chinese have appeared to regard the breaking of the "nuclear monopoly" of the superpowers as the first step toward changing the present international system so that their own objectives can be fulfilled. At present, it seems that Communist China could adopt three different, although not necessarily exclusive, strategies to achieve this purpose, i.e., the breaking of the "nuclear monopoly": total nuclear disarmament; nuclear proliferation; and nuclear weapons development.

#### (1) Total Nuclear Disarmament

As early as 1958, adopting a policy similar to that of the Soviet Union, Communist China called for a conference of the heads of the big powers to stop nuclear weapons tests on the high seas and to



ban the manufacture, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup> However, not until after 1963 did it make a complete nuclear disarmament proposal. In July, 1963, Communist China suggested that

all countries in the world, both nuclear and non-nuclear, solemnly declare that they will prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons completely, thoroughly, totally and resolutely. Concretely speaking, they will not use nuclear weapons, nor export, nor import, nor manufacture, nor test, nor stockpile them; and they will destroy all the existing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in the world, and disband all the existing establishments for the research, testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons in the world.<sup>5</sup>

At the same time, it proposed a conference of the government heads of all the countries of the world to discuss the above matters.<sup>6</sup>

However, Communist China made it very clear that as long as "imperialist countries" exist in the world, no general disarmament would be acceptable. Instead, it called for complete destruction of nuclear weapons:

We are in favour of general disarmament and hold that the imperialists can be forced to accept certain agreements on disarmament through the unremitting struggle of the people of all countries. We are of the opinion that complete and thorough prohibition of nuclear weapons can be achieved while imperialism still exists, just as poison gas was prohibited. The reason is that the use of such a weapon of mass destruction is completely contrary to



the will of the people and would, moreover, subject the users to destruction. However, universal and complete disarmament can be realized only after imperialism, capitalism and all systems of exploitation have been eliminated.<sup>7</sup>

Communist China's desire for a complete nuclear disarmament and its opposition to any general disarmament including conventional force are quite understandable. As mentioned earlier, in Communist China's view, revolutions must rely on armed force and violence: "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Without a strong conventional force, revolutionary activity would be very difficult. On the other hand, if there were a complete nuclear disarmament, the superpowers' nuclear deterrence would be eliminated and Communist China, with its strong ground forces, would have more freedom to act in Asia.

In 1964, after its first nuclear test, a more detailed proposal was made. In addition to reiterating its appeal for a summit conference and complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, Communist China proposed that countries promise not to use nuclear weapons unless subjected to nuclear attack. This would serve as the first step to "the



ultimate goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons:"

This concrete proposal by the Chinese government that an agreement be reached first on not using nuclear weapons is practical, fair and reasonable, easily feasible and involves no question of control. If all the countries concerned are willing to make this commitment, then the danger of nuclear war will be immediately reduced. And this would mean a big initial step towards the ultimate goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. After that, it would be possible to discuss the question of the halting of all kinds of nuclear tests, the prohibition of the export, import, proliferation, manufacture, stockpiling and destruction of nuclear weapons.<sup>8</sup>

In his cable to government heads of the world, Chou En-lai also maintained that

as the first step, the summit conference should reach an agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which may soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons, . . .<sup>9</sup>

Thus, after its first nuclear test, Communist China had introduced a new pre-condition to complete nuclear disarmament: the pledge not to use nuclear weapons.

Later in the year, contrary to what it had been preaching in the past, Communist China announced its opposition to not only a three-environment test ban treaty, but also a comprehensive test ban treaty,<sup>10</sup>



In addition, it refused to take part in the then-named Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference and a proposed summit conference to be participated in by only the five nuclear countries.<sup>11</sup> More significantly, Communist China repudiated the argument that the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons should be the first step toward total nuclear disarmament. Its reasoning is:

At first glance, such opinion seems to be not entirely senseless. But after a careful study, it is not difficult to see that this suggestion has a serious weakness. Devils are devils, whether they have long or short legs. Conventional weapons can launch nuclear bombs as well as the intercontinental missile. And ordinary aircraft can carry nuclear weapons as well as strategic bombers. The means of delivery is no longer as important a problem as it used to be, particularly since the United States is working hard to develop small but powerful nuclear weapons. The proposal to first of all destroy the means of delivery in effect confuses the question of complete prohibition of nuclear weapons with the questions of reduction of conventional arms and thus greatly complicates the issue.<sup>12</sup>

Apparently, Communist China feared that in the event of the destruction of the means of delivery, the United States still could have launched a nuclear attack on China. Besides, Communist China was proposing a "not-to-use pledge" as the first step toward complete nuclear disarmament. Supporting anything else as



the first step would have been self-contradictory.

From what has been examined above, the following conclusions can be drawn:

First, Communist China, after its first nuclear test, no longer advocated a "complete ban" on nuclear tests, a scheme it had previously supported. Its reason was understandable: such a "complete ban", if realized, would prohibit all kinds of nuclear tests, including those conducted by Communist China; it was therefore obviously inimical to the Chinese determination to continue its nuclear weapons program.

Secondly, after its first test, Communist China began to claim that a "not-to-use pledge" was the first step toward complete nuclear disarmament. Communist China might be sincere in advocating this "pledge." For one thing, if the superpowers were to accept its proposal, their ability to apply nuclear pressure on Communist China would be greatly reduced.

There are reasons to believe that Communist China never expected the superpowers to accept its proposal. The United States, for one, has not been



very enthusiastic about the proposal. One of the reasons is that the United States currently has many treaty obligations and commitments in Asia. A not-to-use pledge would seriously reduce their credibility to the allies and their effectiveness against possible adversaries. As U.S. Secretary State Rusk said,

the defense system of the United States and its allies, freely arrived at in accord with the United Nations Charter, includes nuclear weapons. This must continue to be the case.<sup>13</sup>

In reply to Communist China's proposed pledge, U.S. President Johnson said that Communist China "fools no one when it offers to trade away its first small accumulation of nuclear power against the mighty arsenals of those who limit Communist Chinese ambitions."<sup>14</sup> Dean Rusk called it, along with other Chinese proposals, a "smoke screen" to cover up their other intentions.<sup>15</sup>

The Soviet Union did not oppose the proposed pledge openly. However, it probably would not have accepted it either, judging by its previous position. For instance, in the United Nations, it merely agreed



to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty.<sup>16</sup> Reactions by other countries were also cool.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, although Communist China might be sincere in proposing this "not-to-use pledge" and other measures of disarmament, it appears to realize that its proposals have no chance of being accepted. Therefore, it only expects its proposals to serve the following purposes:

(1) Through these "peaceful gestures" to attempt to convince the superpowers of its peaceful intention so that they would not consider taking any action against the Chinese nuclear weapons development, such as the destruction of the Chinese nuclear facilities.

(2) To reduce unfavourable reactions to the Chinese nuclear tests or fear among other Asian countries.

(3) To cover up its refusal to sign the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

## (2) Nuclear Proliferation



For Communist China, the second approach to breaking the "monopoly of nuclear weapons" and the "co-domination" of the world by the superpowers is to have as many nuclear countries in the world as possible, so that the nuclear deterrence maintained by the superpowers in the world could be discredited. This position makes Communist China one of the very few countries in the world which openly advocates nuclear proliferation.

Beginning in 1956-7, both the United States and the Soviet Union began to worry about the problem of nuclear proliferation. However, many high-ranking Chinese officers indicated that they considered nuclear proliferation to be desirable. For example, in 1958, General Liu Ya-lou, Commander in Chief of the Communist Chinese Air Force and in 1961, Chen Yi, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, both said that the spread of nuclear weapons to as many countries as possible was desirable, for it would increase the prospects of complete nuclear disarmament.<sup>18</sup> Communist China also maintained that unless the United States stopped all nuclear tests, every country should seek for nuclear weapons.<sup>19</sup> In August 1963, Communist China



claimed:

Did the danger of nuclear war become greater or less when the number of nuclear powers increased from one to two? We say it becomes less, not greater.

Whether or not nuclear weapons help peace depends on who possesses them. It is detrimental to peace if they are in the hands of imperialist countries; it helps peace if they are in the hands of socialist countries. It must not be said indiscriminately that the danger of nuclear war increases along with the increase in the number of nuclear power.<sup>20</sup>

The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, sponsored by the superpowers should therefore be, in Communist China's view, rejected because it was designed by them to "consolidate their nuclear monopoly."<sup>21</sup>

In 1964, immediately after its first nuclear test on October 16, there were some notable changes in Communist China's policy toward nuclear proliferation. Before the test, Communist China, although it opposed the Partial Test Ban Treaty, still advocated a total nuclear test ban. However, after its first nuclear test in 1964, it started to denounce such a total ban. It argued that because the United States had already conducted hundreds of nuclear tests and possessed a huge stockpile of nuclear weapons, a complete nuclear test ban would not affect its "monopoly"



of nuclear weapons.<sup>22</sup> Its true motive probably is this: now that it has already successfully conducted its first nuclear test, it intends to conduct more in the future. A total test ban would make this impossible.

After its first nuclear test, Communist China stopped actively advocating nuclear proliferation for a while. But it still claimed that the possession of nuclear weapons by socialist countries like China, was desirable:

The nuclear weapons in the hands of China and those in the hands of U.S. imperialism are, of course, fundamentally different in nature. China is a socialist country. . . . Having possessed nuclear weapons, we shall continue to pursue, as we did in the past, the foreign policy of peace. . . . 23

So far, Communist China's position on world nuclear proliferation remains unchanged. Although Communist China might not at present be able to help other countries possess nuclear weapons, its stand and arguments in favor of nuclear proliferation might have significant impact on many non-nuclear countries in the world and might encourage many countries to develop their nuclear capabilities.



### (3) Development of Nuclear Weapons

Although, as examined above, Communist China has advocated nuclear proliferation, it appears that its more direct and true intention is to find a rationale for the development of its own nuclear weapons. It appears that in the Chinese view, the most effective way to break the "nuclear monopoly" and "world co-domination" by the superpowers is by China's becoming a strong and powerful nuclear country itself. In fact, this is its most important alternative and Communist China apparently has pursued it most vigorously. The next chapter will examine this alternative.



Notes (Chapter III)

<sup>1</sup>"People of the World, Unite!" Strive for the Complete Prohibition and Thorough Destruction of Nuclear Weapons!" People's Daily, August 2, 1963, Peking Review, No. 32 (August 2, 1963). 8.

<sup>2</sup>"Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3," August 15, 1963, People of the World, Unite (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 24.

<sup>3</sup>People's Daily, editorial, October 22, 1964, in SCMP, No. 3325.

<sup>4</sup>Kuo Mo-jo is President of the Chinese Academy of Science. For details of his proposal, see NCNA, February 4, 1958, SCMP, No. 1708 (February 7, 1958), 41-2.

<sup>5</sup>"Statement of the Chinese Government Advocating the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons," July 31, 1963, Peking Review, No. 31 (August 2, 1963), 8.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>"Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 21," September 1, 1963, Peking Review, No. 36 (September 6, 1963), People of the World. . . , 59. Underline mine.

<sup>8</sup>Peking Review, No. 44 (October 30, 1964), 6-7.

<sup>9</sup>"Premier Chou Cables Government Heads of the World," Peking Review, No. 43, (October 23, 1964), 6.

<sup>10</sup>"New Starting Point for Efforts to Ban Nuclear Weapons Completely," People Daily, Editorial, November 22, 1964, Peking Review, No. 48, (November 27, 1964), 12-4.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>U.N. Documents, A/5174, Annex II (1962), 78. However, many American writers argue that a "not-to-use pledge" is highly desirable. See for example, Bernard T. Feld, "A Pledge: No First Use," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (May, 1967), 48. Robert C. Tucker, "Proliferation and Soviet-American Relations," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (October 1966), 14-8.



<sup>14</sup> New York Times, October 19, 1964.

<sup>15</sup> New York Times, October 22, 1964.

<sup>16</sup> ENDC Document, ENDC/167 (1966).

<sup>17</sup> R.L. Powell, "Risks of Nuclear Proliferation: China's Bomb: Exploitation and Reaction," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4 (July, 1965), 624.

<sup>18</sup> See for example, People's Daily, April 7, 1958, HCNA, April 7, 1958, SCMP, No. 1749, 43-44.

<sup>19</sup> People's Daily, December 22, 1961.

<sup>20</sup> "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3," August 15, 1963, People of the World . . . ., 22.

<sup>21</sup> "U.S. Nuclear Fraud Exposed," People's Daily, July 19, 1963, Peking Review, No. 30 (July 26, 1963), 47.

For details, see also People's Daily, July 29, August 1-5, August 10, and August 15, 1963.

<sup>22</sup> People's Daily, Editorial, October 22, 1964. See also "Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons," Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 11-19.

<sup>23</sup> "Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons," 15. See also "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China" October 16, 1964, Break the Nuclear Monopoly. . . , 1-5.

<sup>24</sup> Peking Review, No. 41 (October 8, 1965), 8-9.

<sup>25</sup> "A Chinese Statement on Nuclear Proliferation", People's Daily, November 15, 1966, Peking Review (November 18, 1966), reprinted in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May, 1967), 53-4. Communist China also called the Treaty a "monstrous fraud." For details, see "Ban on Nuclear Proliferation and Peiping's H-bomb Test," Wen-ti yi yuan-chu, Vol. 7, No. 1 (October, 1967), 54-56.



## CHAPTER IV

### COMMUNIST CHINA AND ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

Communist China's nuclear program actually started about 1953, nominally to develop the peaceful use of atomic energy. In May of the same year a Committee of Atomic Energy was set up in the Chinese Academy of Science<sup>1</sup> and as early as March 1954, Kuo Mo-jo, President of the Academy, announced that China had laid the foundation of atomic energy research.<sup>2</sup> On October 12, 1954, an agreement to cooperate on scientific and technological matters was signed by Communist China and the Soviet Union. On January 18, 1955, the Soviet Union announced that it would help Communist China to study the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and that the latter was to receive a research reactor with a head capacity of 6,500-10,000 kw.<sup>3</sup> In the same year, Communist China announced its first Five-Year Plan in which the development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy was listed as the first major task.<sup>4</sup>

On October 15, 1957, the "New Technology for National Defense" agreement was signed by the Soviet



Union and Communist China. In the agreement, the Soviet Union promised China a joint research program on 122 scientific and technological items from 1958 to 1962. Later reports simply suggested that key fields in this joint research program were to be physics and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.<sup>5</sup>

The Academy's Institute of Physics was also expanded, and by the end of 1957, the Institute had more than 200 personnel, including eighty scientists and seventy technicians.<sup>6</sup> It was probably in 1957-8 that Communist China started to develop its independent nuclear weapons program.<sup>7</sup> In 1958, the first Chinese experimental reactor with a head capacity of 7,000 to 10,000 kilowatts went into operation.<sup>8</sup> The first chain reaction started and the first uranium was produced in the same year,<sup>9</sup> with Kuo Mo-jo announcing that Communist China was entering the atomic age.<sup>10</sup>

With Russian assistance, Communist China made extensive progress in its nuclear program.<sup>10</sup> However, after 1959, the Soviet Union began to withdraw aid from the Chinese program and apparently decided to discontinue its assistance altogether. At the same time, it tore up the "new Technology for National Defense" Agreement of 1957 and urged the Communist Chinese not to



seek an independent nuclear capability. What is more, Communist China said:

As far back as 1959, the Soviet leaders made a gift to the United States of their refusal to provide China with the technical data required for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. But for the sake of large interest, we never mentioned this before, not even between fraternal parties.

Not only have you [i.e. the Soviet Union] perfidiously and unilaterally scrapped the agreement on providing China with nuclear technical data, but you have blatantly given more and more military aid to the Indian reactionaries.<sup>12</sup>

Communist China also accused the Soviet Union of breaking a promise to provide China with a sample atomic bomb and technical data on its manufactures.<sup>13</sup> Although the Soviet Union denied this promise, Alice Langley Hsieh believes that there was probably such a promise made at the time of the Mao-Khrushchev meeting in November, 1957.<sup>14</sup>

After July, 1960, the Soviet Union further withdrew its nuclear assistance from Communist China. Russian personnel, especially those involved in nuclear research, left China for the Soviet Union.<sup>15</sup> Communist China's determination to continue its nuclear weapons development however, remained unchanged,<sup>16</sup> and it concentrated personnel and resources on the development of nuclear weapons, which it regarded as



"peak science."<sup>17</sup> In October 1961, Chen Yi claimed that it was only a matter of time before China possessed nuclear weapons.<sup>18</sup> In 1963, he said that China would have to produce nuclear weapons even if the Chinese were so poor that they could not afford to buy trousers.<sup>19</sup> In July 1963, Kuo Mo-jo announced that Communist China would soon break the monopoly of nuclear weapons maintained by the present nuclear powers.<sup>20</sup>

Through its determination and intensive effort, Communist China successfully conducted its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, on the test grounds at Lop Nor in Sinkiang province.<sup>21</sup> It was a fixed explosion on a 70-meter steel tower. Significantly, it was a fission device built of enriched uranium, i.e., U-235,<sup>22</sup> which produced a yield equivalent to 20 kilotons of T.N.T. Apparently Communist China had successfully separated out U-238 to produce enriched uranium (U-235). This process is much more difficult and sophisticated than the one using natural uranium to produce plutonium for the bombs, a method used by Great Britain and France in their nuclear weapons programs. This test has two implications. First, Communist China is capable of extracting fissionable U-235



in substantial quantities on a large scale through its gaseous diffusion plant.<sup>23</sup> Secondly, since enriched uranium (U-235) could increase a country's capability to produce tritium, a basic constituent of thermonuclear bombs, the result of this test suggests that Communist China might have intended to develop its hydrogen bombs. Thus, the British Royal Institute for International Affairs predicted that Communist China might have hydrogen bombs within two to five years.<sup>24</sup> Communist China's later tests proved that this was indeed the case.

In addition, in the first test, a relatively "advanced" trigger technique called "implosion" was used.<sup>25</sup> This system is more advanced than the usually used "gun-barrel" trigger technique and since it can guarantee "sure-fire", it can be used in war without testing. The use of this system surprised many U.S. authorities, including the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.<sup>26</sup>

On May 14, 1965, Communist China conducted its second nuclear test: a bomb delivered by an airplane (probably a TU-4) was exploded over the same site as the previous one.<sup>27</sup> Like the first one, this test



used uranium, but it produced a yield equivalent to 40-50 kilotons of T.N.T.<sup>28</sup> Since the bomb was dropped from an airplane, it meant that Communist China had perfected a device compact enough to be carried by aircraft. After the test, experts estimated that China was capable of testing a dozen bombs like this a year.<sup>29</sup>

The third test was conducted on May 9, 1966, when a bomb was dropped from an airplane (probably a TU-16 bomber) and produced a yield equivalent to 200 kilotons of T.N.T. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission speculated that a core of enriched uranium with quantities of lithium-6, a thermonuclear material, was used as a liner.<sup>30</sup> A fission trigger was also used to ignite the thermonuclear material.<sup>31</sup> This test indicated that Communist China was on its way toward H-bomb development.<sup>32</sup>

In early 1966, U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara estimated that Communist China would soon be able to launch a nuclear attack on countries within 500 miles of its borders.<sup>33</sup> His estimate seemed to be at least partially correct. On October 27, 1966, Communist China conducted its fourth test, using a nuclear warhead



on a guided missile.<sup>34</sup> The missile was probably similar to Russia's SS-4 medium-range type. It carried a warhead made of uranium-235 a distance of approximately 600 miles<sup>35</sup> and reportedly hit the target accurately.<sup>36</sup> The blast produced a yield equivalent to 20 kilotons of T.N.T.<sup>37</sup>

The fifth test was a bomb detonation on December 28, 1966. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission estimated the size of the blast at "a few hundred kilotons,"<sup>38</sup> probably between 300 and 500 Kilotons.<sup>39</sup> The Commission also observed that the test used a triple-stage method in its explosion. Consequently, the bomb was not only very powerful but also the "dirtiest,"<sup>40</sup> in the sense that radiation and fallout output was maximized. Since thermonuclear reaction had taken place, U.S. experts regarded the test as a sign of Communist China's progress in the manufacture of fissionable material<sup>41</sup> and one more step toward development of an H-bomb.<sup>42</sup>

Then, on June 17, 1967, came the sixth test, which consisted of a hydrogen bomb dropped from a high-flying TU-16. Its blast produced a powerful yield equivalent to 3-7 megatons of T.N.T.<sup>43</sup> U.S.



officials were surprised by the speed of Communist China's H-bomb development and U.S. senator John O. Pastore called the test a "dramatic and upsetting event."<sup>44</sup> Based on the fourth test and this test, U.S. military analysts expressed the opinion that Communist China had given priority to its missile development rather than its nuclear capacity. Pressure was also felt for the development of a missile defense system in the United States.<sup>45</sup>

On December 24, 1967, an attempted thermonuclear explosion was conducted.<sup>46</sup> Only the first fission cycle in the process was completed and therefore it only produced a yield equivalent to 20,000 tons of T.N.T. The test was never officially announced by Communist China.

After this abortive test, there was no nuclear test until December 27, 1968, when a hydrogen bomb was detonated.<sup>47</sup> It produced a yield equivalent to 3 megatons of T.N.T. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission confirmed it to be a thermonuclear test.<sup>48</sup>

Finally, in September, 1969, two tests were conducted in rapid succession. The first one was an underground nuclear detonation conducted on September 22 [Mainland China time September 23], which pro-



duced an explosion equivalent to 200 to 250 kilotons of T.N.T. The second one was a hydrogen bomb explosion conducted on September 29, which produced an explosion equivalent to 3 megatons of T.N.T.<sup>49</sup>

Based on these tests, it is clear that Communist China's nuclear weapons program has been carried on at a fast pace. It took the country only two-and-a-half years after its first test in 1964 to explode its first H-bomb. It also successfully reduced the size and weight of its warheads to deliverable form, and conducted its first underground test. It has thus already passed France in nuclear weapons development and may overtake Britain in the near future.<sup>50</sup>

Communist China takes great pride in what it has achieved in its nuclear weapons development.

The first nuclear test by our country surpassed the levels attained in the initial tests of the United States, Britain and France! It took China just over a year to carry out a nuclear explosion containing thermonuclear material after successfully exploding its first atomic bomb. This big-leap-forward speed fully proves that the Chinese people, armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung, dare to break a path none before has walked and dare to scale peaks others have not climbed.<sup>51</sup>

At the same time, Communist China also stated that



it would try to develop technology in its program.

If we do not want to follow the old path of the technical development of other countries and crawl after others, we must break conventions and learn from advanced experience as much as possible.<sup>52</sup>

In late 1969, after it had successfully conducted two nuclear tests: one underground explosion and one hydrogen bomb, Communist China claimed that it was making the most rapid progress in science:

The successful tests of atom bomb, guided missiles and hydrogen bombs one after another in China are eloquent proof that China's socialist industry, science and technology are advancing rapidly. It took seven years and four months for the United States of America to advance from the explosion of the first atom bomb to a nuclear explosion containing thermonuclear material. In two years and eight months China successfully exploded her first hydrogen bomb. Confronted with these iron-clad facts, even our enemies have to admit that China is making the most rapid progress in the world in the development of the most advanced science and technology.<sup>53</sup>

Many western experts agree that Communist China has already made very impressive advancement in nuclear weapons development and can produce H-bombs by a comparatively simple process.<sup>54</sup> Many U.S. officials as well as the U.S. Joint Congressional Commission on Atomic Energy admitted that China's nuclear weapons



progress has been more rapid and surprisingly more effective than had been expected or predicted. The Commission's report was based on secret testimony in early 1967 by representatives of the State and Defense Departments, the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and many atomic weapons laboratories.<sup>55</sup> Dr. R.E. Lapp also believed that Communist China would be able to challenge the United States sooner than U.S. military officials expected.<sup>56</sup>

At present, the Communist Chinese resources known to exist outside of official circles in China are as follows.

#### Facilities

There are at least four operational nuclear plants in Communist China. The first one, which is probably the most important, is a gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow. It could produce uranium-235 with an annual capacity of more than 100 kilograms in 1963, when it began its operation, and was estimated to be able to produce about 500 kilograms annually in 1967.<sup>57</sup> Its present capacity is probably even greater. The



second one is a reactor at Paotou in Suiyuan province and was first heard of outside China in 1964. It is believed to belong to the 100,000,000 to 200,000,000 kw class and can produce about 10 kilograms of plutonium-239 annually.<sup>58</sup> The third nuclear plant is the Yumen atomic energy plant located in Kansu province. It can produce approximately 200 kilograms of plutonium-239 annually.<sup>59</sup> The fourth one is the Haiyen nuclear plant on the eastern shore of Lake Tsinghai. It was completed in 1967 and was designed to produce uranium bombs, but the exact products remain unknown.<sup>60</sup> It appears that Communist China has an adequate supply of uranium for its future nuclear weapons program.

### Personnel

It has been estimated that if a country wishes to build installations to produce nuclear weapons on a continuous basis, approximately 1,300 to 2,000 engineers and 500 to 750 scientists will be required for research and operation.<sup>61</sup> These engineers and scientists would include chemists, physicists, chemical engineers, mechanical engineers, electrical engineers, electronic engineers, radiological engineers, metallur-



gists, and civil/architectural engineers.<sup>62</sup> Until 1960, Communist China had relied on the approximately 11,000 to 50,000 Russian specialists in China to develop its science and technology. More than 700 of them were intended to help Communist China to establish a new educational system.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, about 38,000 Chinese scientists were receiving training in the Soviet Union, and many of them worked at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna in Russia.<sup>64</sup>

After 1961, Communist China turned to European countries for help. Chinese scientists visited and worked at European research institutes in France and England. Scientists from advanced countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Austria, and Japan often visited Communist China as well; some of them stayed to help train Chinese personnel.<sup>65</sup> Many Chinese scientists hold higher degrees from technically advanced western countries. In Communist China, there were reportedly 1,100 scientists, engineers, and medical doctors with overseas Ph.D. degrees and 5,500 others with other degrees in science, engineering, or medicine received overseas.<sup>66</sup> Through these scien-



tists, modern scientific methods and technical skills were introduced into China and helped it lay the foundation of a nuclear weapons program.

In Communist China, many established institutes also conduct intensive training programs for scientists. Among the important institutes are Peking University, the Chinese University of Science and Technology, the Chinese Academy of Science of Peking, the Institute of Applied Physics, and the Academy of Military Science. It has been estimated that from 1949 to 1960, about 230,000 engineers and scientists graduated from these institutes and 2,000,000 more had done so by 1967.<sup>67</sup>

A possible personnel problem for Communist China may be the lack of senior scientists; although it has already had many outstanding experts such as Chien San-chiang, Wang Kan-chang, Chao Chung-yao, and Wei Chung-hua. Wang and Chieng are now in charge of Communist China's nuclear weapons program.<sup>68</sup>

#### Natural Resources

The most important natural resource needed for



the manufacture of nuclear weapons is uranium. Reportedly, rich uranium ore beds were discovered in Sinkiang province between 1944 and 1949.<sup>69</sup> Uranium deposits were also found in Anshan, Chungchak, Altai, Kashgar, and other places.<sup>70</sup> Large-scale exploitation began around 1950-51 through Sino-Soviet joint effort but after 1962 Communist China took over the complete operation.<sup>71</sup>

Besides uranium, Communist China also has within its borders many of the resources required for nuclear weapons development, including the lithium concentrates needed for the production of hydrogen bombs.<sup>72</sup>

#### Equipment, Instruments, and Materials

Before 1960, most technical equipment and precision instruments used in Communist Chinese scientific research were supplied by the Soviet Union. Afterwards, Communist China began to import a large quantity of these materials and this equipment from various other advanced countries, especially Japan, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and West Germany. Japanese firms have not only assembled and installed the equipment they sold, but they have also



assisted in training Chinese personnel. The materials they sold to Communist China include the basic components of rocket warheads.<sup>73</sup> The West Germany firms provide Communist China with electronic computers, measuring instruments for tracking missiles, and materials for nuclear reactors.<sup>74</sup> The Swiss firms provide Communist China with rocket engineering tools and measuring instruments. During 1966-1967, Communist China reportedly paid some twenty-five million dollars to Swiss firms alone.<sup>75</sup>

Thus, it appears that Communist China has access to equipment and instruments needed for its nuclear weapons development.

Presently, Communist China appears to have given top priority to the manufacture of electronic, automation, and precision instruments, as well as equipment and heavy machinery.<sup>76</sup> Many of its "Machine Building Ministries" concentrate on the development of the radio-active elements, the industries of electronics, telecommunications and aeromechanic industry.<sup>77</sup> Thus, Communist China might even become self-sufficient in the future.



## Delivery System

Delivery capability is an important step in nuclear weapons development. For Communist China, there are three possible alternatives in building up a delivery system: long-range manned bombing aircraft, middle-range missiles, and intercontinental range missiles (ICBM).

Communist China's present manned bomber force consists of approximately 300 TU-4 bombers and as many IL-28 models. Each bomber can carry a bomb load of two tons.<sup>78</sup> Communist China's fourth and sixth tests indicated that it was capable of reducing the size and weight of its bombs so that they could be carried and dropped by these bombers.<sup>79</sup>

However, recent developments indicate that Communist China did not choose to develop its manned bombers. It has generally ignored the deficiencies of its aircraft and flying personnel and its air force remains rather weak.<sup>80</sup> Instead, priority has been given to missile development. At first, Communist China's short-range rockets were apparently Soviet-made,<sup>81</sup> but by 1958, it had decided to give priority to the development of its own missile production.<sup>82</sup> It has been reported that as early as 1963, Communist



China had already tested missiles on 500 to 700 mile ranges.<sup>83</sup> At present, Communist China probably has two programs: medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) on the one hand, and the ICBMs, with a range of several thousand missiles, on the other. Both MRBMs and IRBMs are very mobile and "could be tailored to a procurement of long-range submarines capable of launching missiles, as well as being launched from ground bases."<sup>84</sup> The missile used by Communist China in its fourth test belonged to one of these categories, and it is believed that this is the area in which Communist China has placed its emphasis.<sup>85</sup>

However, Communist China does not appear to have forsaken the option of ICBMs. To be sure, some authorities have doubts about Communist China's plan to build up an ICBM force. For instance, in 1965, Morton H. Halperin observed:

In view of the high costs and resources that would be needed to create an intercontinental delivery capability. . . . the Chinese might decide to postpone indefinitely the development of an intercontinental capability.<sup>86</sup>

His estimate does not appear to be completely correct. For one thing, even token ICBMs which could reach Moscow and Washington would give Communist China tre-



mendous psychological satisfaction and a feeling of "equal power" with the superpowers. Furthermore, as shall be discussed below,<sup>87</sup> its political impact on Asian countries would be very great. Many Asian countries might therefore align themselves more closely with Communist China. Both for psychological and political reasons, therefore, Communist China probably would regard it advisable to develop its ICBMs. As early as 1964, Chen Yi had asserted that China was determined to "catch up" with the superpowers:

Whatever the leading powers in the world can do, whatever level of technology they have reached, we want to catch up and arrive at the same level.<sup>88</sup>

Some evidence has shown that Communist China may have already begun its ICBM program.<sup>89</sup> A recent study in Hong Kong of reports from Peking indicates that Communist China is stepping up its ICBM program.<sup>90</sup>

#### Present Missile Program and Nuclear Warhead Development

At present, Communist China already has a limited ability to produce and assemble missiles. It has many missile-producing and assembling plants at Paotou, Sian, Shenyang, and other places. The shells



and engines of the missiles are produced at the Shenyang Ordnance Factory, Harbin Ordnance Factory, Sian Factory, Kansu Ordnance Factory, and Chengtu Factory. Solid and liquid fuels for missiles are produced at the Liaoyan Ordnance Factory, Taiyuan Factory, Hsianghsing Gunpowder Factory in Hunan, Lu-Ta (Port Arthur and Dairen) Missile Fuel Plant, and the Lanchow Missile Fuel Plant. Outsiders already know of three Chinese test grounds for missiles:

(1) the Paotou missile testing ground which serves short range ground-to-ground missiles. (2) the Western Ningsia Missile testing center which accommodates ground-to-air, air-to-air, and ground-to-ground missiles of medium and short range. Reportedly, this center is also prepared for the testing of long range missiles. In addition, this center also has an assembling shop, a hangar, a test station, six test positions, and tracking and logistical facilities. (3) the Chang Hsin Tien missile testing ground which has facilities for engine testing.<sup>91</sup>

As far as missile personnel are concerned, Communist China has also established training institutes such as The Science and Technology University in the Chinese Academy of Science, the Tsinghua University,



the Peking Aeronautical Engineering College, the Institute of Upper Atmosphere Physics (in Wuhan), the Institute of Automation and Remote Control (in Peking), and the Institute of Mechanics and Electronics (in Peking). Communist China also has many prominent senior experts on missiles and rockets, like Chieng Hsueh-shen [or Tsien Hsue-shen] and Chien Wei-chang.<sup>92</sup> Chieng has played a leading role in Communist China's missile tests.<sup>93</sup>

#### Future Prospect

In view of its present rate of nuclear weapons development, Communist China most likely will become a major nuclear power in the foreseeable future. As early as 1965, U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara had predicted that Communist China would produce enough fissionable material to start small stockpiles by 1967.<sup>94</sup> In October, 1966, Dr. R. E. Lapp observed that Communist China could have one hundred atomic bombs and missile warheads by 1967.<sup>95</sup> This was confirmed by Japanese military officials later in 1967,<sup>96</sup> who estimated that Communist China already had about one hundred nuclear bombs. In June 1967 another report conservatively estimated that Communist China already had at



least thirty bombs.<sup>97</sup>

While discussing Communist China's delivering capability after its first nuclear test in 1964, Professor R. Hilsman warned that it could be capable of delivering weapons within five to ten years instead of ten to twelve years as U.S. official estimated.<sup>98</sup> In early 1966, McNamara estimated that Communist China would be able to launch a nuclear attack on countries within 500 miles of her borders within two to three years.<sup>99</sup> The fourth test in October 1966 indicated that both estimates were for the most part correct. Later in the same year, H. W. Baldwin observed that Communist China already had some small nuclear warheads that could be delivered over short distances.<sup>100</sup> In 1967, U.S. Senator Henry Jackson, a Congressional spokesman, warned that Communist China would shortly deploy missiles that could deliver nuclear weapons on targets within 1,000 miles of its borders and would be capable of launching a nuclear attack on the United States by the early 1970s.<sup>101</sup> In a less pessimistic view, the Senate-House Atomic Energy Committee estimated that Communist China might have a sizable force of IRBMs and MRBMs by 1975-85.<sup>102</sup> Similarly J.I. Coffey, chief of the Office of National



Security Studies of Bendix System Division, can only say that Communist China would not have a token ICBM force by 1975.<sup>103</sup> In 1970, the U.S. State Department said that Communist China should have a medium-range ballistic system soon and a moderate intercontinental ballistic missile force by the mid-1970s.<sup>104</sup>

The above discussion indicates that at the present rate, Communist China will become a major nuclear power, possibly within the next fifteen years. When Communist China becomes a major nuclear power, the present "bipolarity" will be finally broken, and the present international political system will permanently transformed.



## Notes (Chapter IV)

<sup>1</sup>Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Fix III, "China--the Nuclear Threat," Air University Quarterly Review, (March-April, 1966), 32.

See also "Progress of Nuclear Weapons in Communist China," Military Review, (May, 1965), 9.

<sup>2</sup>"Problems in Communist China's Nuclear Test," Communist Chinese Affairs Monthly, Vol. 8, No. 4 (May 31, 1965), 12.

<sup>3</sup>Chu-yuan Cheng, interview, "The Truth about Red China's Bomb," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. IVII, No. 26, (December 28, 1964), 32. See also Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1962), 20-21.

<sup>4</sup>"Progress of Nuclear Weapons in Communist China," 9.

<sup>5</sup>NCNA, January 18, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1696, (January 22, 1958), 34-5, quoted in Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era, 101.

<sup>6</sup>"Progress of Nuclear Weapons in Communist China," 10.

<sup>7</sup>Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 71. See also: A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to American Policy (New York: Random House, 1960), 116.

<sup>8</sup>"Progress of Nuclear Weapons in Communist China," 10.

<sup>9</sup>Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, 75. See also: Communist Chinese Affairs Monthly, Vol. 8, No. 4 (May 31, 1965), 13.

<sup>10</sup>Robert Guillain, "Ten Years of Secrecy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (February, 1967), 24-5.



11

New York Times, September 18, 1959

12 "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government-- A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 21," People of the World, Unite , for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 37-8.

13 "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3," People of the world. . . ., 30.

14 New York Times, August 22, 1963. For Alice Langley Hsieh's comment, see her Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era, 100.

15 "Problems in Communist China's Nuclear Test," 13.

16 Tsui Chui-yen, "Peiping's Design in Exploding Its Nuclear Device," Issues and Studies, Vol. 1, No. 6 (March, 1965), 12.

17 Ibid.

18 "Problems in Communist China's Nuclear Test," 13.

19 New York Times, October 29, 1963.

20 "Problems in Communist China's Nuclear Test," 13.

21 New York Times, October 17, 1964.

22 New York Times, October 22, 1964.

23 For further discussion in this regard, see David R. Inglis, "The Chinese Bombshell," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (February, 1965), 20.

24 New York Times, December 4, 1964.

25 Ibid.



<sup>26</sup>For details, see Joseph E. Fix III, "China--the Nuclear Threat," 34; David R. Inglis, "The Chinese Bombshell," 20.

<sup>27</sup>New York Times, May 15, 1965.

<sup>28</sup>New York Times, May 21, 1965. See also Chinese Communist Affairs Bi-Monthly (April, 1968), 6.

<sup>29</sup>For details, see W. L. Ryan and S. Summerlin, China Cloud: America's Tragedy and China's Rise to Nuclear Power (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), 192-3. See also New York Times, May 11, 1966 and May 21, 1966.

<sup>30</sup>Chinese Communist Affairs Bi-Monthly, (April, 1968), 6. See also New York Times, May 15, 1966 and May 21, 1966.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Chinese Communist Affairs Bi-Monthly, (April, 1968), 6. See also New York Times, May 21, 1966 and May 22, 1966.

<sup>33</sup>New York Times, October 28, 1966.

<sup>34</sup>New York Times, October 28, 1966.

<sup>35</sup>Wen-ti yi yuan-chu, Vol. V No. 5 (February, 1966), 2.

<sup>36</sup>NCNA, October 27, 1966.

<sup>37</sup>Wen-ti yi yuan-chu, Vol. V. No. 5, 2.

<sup>38</sup>New York Times, December 29, 1966.

<sup>39</sup>New York Times, December 31, 1966.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>New York Times, December 29, 1966.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>New York Times, June 18, 1967.



<sup>44</sup>New York Times, September 10, 1967.

<sup>45</sup>New York Times, June 18, 1967.

<sup>46</sup>New York Times, January 10, 1968.

<sup>47</sup>New York Times, December 28, and 29, 1968.

<sup>48</sup>New York Times, January 1, 1969.

<sup>49</sup>For details, see "Peiping's Recent Nuclear Detonations: Their Technical and Political Implications," Wen-ti yi yuan-chu, Vol. VI, No. 2 (November 1969), 4-6. See also "China Victoriously Conducts a New Hydrogen Bomb Explosion, Successfully Conducts the First Underground Nuclear Test," Hsinhua Dispatch, October 4, 1969, inserted in Peking Review, No. 40 (October 3, 1969).

<sup>50</sup>Many experts also supported this point of view. For example: W. L. Ryan and Summerlin, China Cloud, 256

"China's Nuclear Option," Michael B. Yahuda, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (February, 1969), 73. Stanley L. Harrison, "Nth Nation Challenges: The Present Perspective," Orbis, Vol. IX, No. 1 (September 1965), 159.

<sup>51</sup>"The Great Victory of Mao Tse-tung Thought," Peking Review, No. 41 (October 7, 1966), 31.

<sup>52</sup>NCNA, December 28, 1969, reprinted in Communist Chinese Affairs Monthly, (January 31, 1969).

<sup>53</sup>Chu Kuang-ya, "Relying on Mao Tse-tung Thought to Scale New Peaks of Science and Technology," Peking Review, No. 41, (October 10, 1969), 22.

<sup>54</sup>See New York Times, April 29, 1965. Many other experts agreed that Communist China apparently assembled its first bomb with more skill than the United States and the Soviet Union had done in their first efforts. New York Times, October 21, 1965.

<sup>55</sup>New York Times, June 18 and August 3, 1967.

<sup>56</sup>New York Times, January 2, 1967.

<sup>57</sup>New York Times, May 15, 1965. See also Communist Chinese Affairs Bi-Monthly (April, 1968), 7.



<sup>58</sup> See for example, Communist Chinese Affairs Bi-Monthly, (April, 1968), 7. The second figure was given by Morton Halperin. See his China and the Bomb, 75. For further discussion in this regard, see Robert Guillain, "Ten Years of Secrecy," 24-5.

<sup>59</sup> Communist Chinese Affairs Bi-Monthly, (April, 1968), 7. See also China and the Bomb, 75 and Robert Guillain, "Ten Years of Secrecy," 24-5.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> See for example, Joseph E. Fix III, "China--the Nuclear Threat," 28-9. See also Morton Halperin, China and the Bomb, 74.

<sup>62</sup> Joseph E. Fix III, "China--the Nuclear Threat," 28-9, 31ff.

<sup>63</sup> For details, see John Lindbeck, "An Isolationist Science Policy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (February, 1969), 68. See also W. L. Ryan and S. Summerlin, China Cloud, 188. C.Y. Cheng, Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China, 1949-63, National Science Foundation (Washington, D.C. U.S. Gov't Printing Off., 1965).

<sup>64</sup> John Lindbeck, "An Isolationist Science Policy," 69.

<sup>65</sup> "Is Red China's H-bomb A Product of the West?" Atlas, Vol. 16 (December, 1968), 22-24.

<sup>66</sup> John Lindbeck, "An Isolationist Science Policy," 68.

<sup>67</sup> W.L. Ryan and S. Summerlin, China Cloud, 188.

<sup>68</sup> Chien San-chiang: received Ph.D. from the University of Paris and was a collaborator of Frederic Jolliot-Curie. He became the director of I.A.E. in 1958, and is the most prominent nuclear physicist in Communist China.

Wang Kan-chang: received Ph.D. in physics from the University of Berlin and worked as a research associate at the University of California. He is now the Deputy Director of the I.A.E. He was a former Deputy Director of the J.I.N.R. in Moscow.



Chao Chung-yao: received Ph.D. from the California Institute of Technology and has been credited with the discovery of gamma rays.

Wei Chung-hua: formerly of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Other top scientists include Peng Huang-wu, Kuo Yung-huai, Chang Chia-hua etc.

For details, see W.L. Ryan and S. Summerlin, China Cloud, 188. New York Times October 25, 1964, January 8, 1967.

<sup>69</sup>"Progress of Nuclear Weapons in Communist China," 11. See also "China--the Nuclear Threat," 33. For details, see also George A. Modelski, "Communist China Prepares for Nuclear Expansion," in his Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc (Carlton, Melbourne University Press, 1959), 181-195.

<sup>70</sup>"China--the Nuclear Threat," 33.

<sup>71</sup>"Progress of Nuclear Weapons in Communist China," 11.

<sup>72</sup>China appears to have produced ample supplies of lithium ore concentrates, beryllium concentrates, boraz, Wolfram concentrates, piezoelectric quartz, mercury, tantalum-niobium concentrates, molybdenum concentrates, and tin, all of which are needed for nuclear weapons development. For details, see John A. Berberet, Science and Technology in Communist China (Santa Barbara, Calif.: General Electric Co., Technical Military Planning Operation, 1960.) See also Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, 74.

<sup>73</sup>"Is Red China's H-bomb A Product of the West?" 22.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., 23.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 31-2.

<sup>77</sup>"Chinese Communist Eight Nuclear Tests Viewed after the Eighth Blast," Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly Vol. II, No. 12 (February 1, 1969), 14.



See also Communist Chinese Affairs Monthly Vol. No. 6 (July 31, 1965), 22. See also Ibid. Vol. 7. No. 11 (December 31, 1964), 89-90.

<sup>78</sup>Leonard Beaton, "The Chinese Bomb: the Institute for Strategic Studies View," Survival, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January-February, 1965), 2-4.

<sup>79</sup>See New York Times, November 2, 1966.

<sup>80</sup>See for example, Bulletin of Activites (July 25, 1961), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, ed. J. Chester Cheng, (Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1966), 671. See also Richard M. Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air Power (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

<sup>81</sup>New York Times, September 18, 1959.

See also Alice Langley Hsieh, "Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (January, 1965), 16-21.

<sup>82</sup>Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, 77.

<sup>83</sup>For details, see Alice Langley Hsieh, "Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue."

<sup>84</sup>Michael B. Yahuda, "China's Nuclear Option," 75.

<sup>85</sup>Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, 154

<sup>86</sup>Michael B. Yahuda, "China's Nuclear Option," 75.

<sup>87</sup>For discussion on Communist China as a major nuclear power, see Infra, Chapter VII

<sup>88</sup>Quoted in The Times (London), May 4, 1964.

<sup>89</sup>Michael B. Yahuda, "China's Nuclear Option," 76

<sup>90</sup>News dispatch from Hong Kong, Edmonton Journal, February 17, 1970.



<sup>91</sup>See Communist Chinese Affairs Bi-Monthly, (April, 1968), 8-9.

<sup>92</sup>Chieng Hsueh-shen: he heads a missile research program in China and was formerly a professor of Jet Propulsion at the California Institute of Technology and was associated with U.S. rocket development programs.

Chien Wei-chang: he had been at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology.

For details, see New York Times, October 28, 1966.

<sup>93</sup>New York Times, October 28, 1966.

<sup>94</sup>New York Times, December 16, 1965.

<sup>95</sup>New York Times, October 30, 1967.

<sup>96</sup>New York Times, January 22, 1967.

<sup>97</sup>New York Times, June 20, 1967.

<sup>98</sup>For Professor Hilsman's statement, see New York Times, November 19, 1964.

<sup>99</sup>New York Times, December 29, 1966.

<sup>100</sup>New York Times, December 29, 1966.

<sup>101</sup>New York Times, January 12, 1967.

<sup>102</sup>For discussion on the Committee's estimate, see Chen Shao-hsien, "Ban on Nuclear Proliferation and Peiping's H-bomb Test," Wen-ti yi yuen-chu Vol. 7, No.1 (October, 1967), 56 ff.

<sup>103</sup>J.I. Coffey, "The Chinese and Ballistic Missile Defence," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (December 1965), 17.

<sup>104</sup>News dispatch from Washington, Edmonton Journal, January 7, 1970.



## CHAPTER V

### COMMUNIST CHINA'S PRESENT NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Critics of Communist China express the opinion that it is an irresponsible and dangerous nuclear power because of its alleged claim that a third world war is inevitable and that it would not matter much if even half of the world population were to die in this war. For example, the Soviet Union claimed that

To prevent a new world war is a real and quite feasible task. The 20th Congress of our party came to the extremely important conclusion that in our times there is no fatal inevitability of war between states. This conclusion is not the fruit of good intentions, but the result of a realistic, strictly scientific analysis of the balance of class forces on the world arena; . . .

And what is the position of the CPC leadership? What do the theses that they propagate mean: an end cannot be put to wars so long as imperialism exists; . . .

These theses mean that the Chinese comrades are acting contrary to the general course of the world communism movement in questions of war and peace. They do not believe in the possibility of preventing a new world war. . . . 1

Ernst Henri, a noted Russian journalist, pointed out that "Peking has. . . decided that a third world war is inevitable for the realization of Mao's master plan."<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union, further accused Communist



China of belittling human lives. It claimed that Communist China had said this:

"Can one guess," he [Mao] said, "how great the toll of human casualties in a future war will be? Possibly it would be a third of the 2,700 million inhabitants of the entire world, i.e., only 900 million people. I consider this to be even low, if atomic bombs should actually fall. Of course it is most terrible. But even half would not be so bad. Why? Because it was not we that wanted it but they. It is they who are imposing war on us. If we fight, atomic and hydrogen weapons will be used. Personally, I think that in the whole world there will be such suffering that half of humanity and perhaps more than a half will perish .

"I [Mao] had an argument about this with Nehru. In this respect he is more pessimistic than I am. I told him that if half of humanity is destroyed, the other half will still remain but imperialism will be destroyed entirely and there will be only socialism in all the world, and within half a century, or a whole century, the population will again increase by even more than half."<sub>3</sub>

Thus, the Soviet Union said, "every communist Leninist will feel disgust at an attitude to thermonuclear war such as this: "Never mind if a half of mankind perishes, if 300 million Chinese die. . . . "<sup>4</sup> Nationalist China warned that "we shudder at the thought of letting the nuclear weapons be handled by such blood-thirsty maniacs."<sup>5</sup> What is more, the Soviet Union pointed out that the Chinese Communist state-



ment "was no chance remark but considered conception."<sup>6</sup>

All these accusations were denied by Communist China. It claimed that Mao had only said the following:

At present another situation has to be taken into account, namely, that the war maniacs may drop atomic and hydrogen bombs everywhere. They drop them and we act after their fashion; thus there will be chaos and lives will be lost. The question has to be considered for the worst. The Political Bureau of our Party has held several sessions to discuss this question. If fighting breaks out now, China has got only hand-grenades and not atomic bombs--which the Soviet Union has though. Let us imagine, how many people will die if war should break out? Out of the world's population of 2,700 million, one-third--or, if more, half--may be lost. It is they and not we who want to fight; when a fight starts, atomic and hydrogen bombs may be dropped. I debated this question with a foreign statesman [Nehru]. He believed that if an atomic war was fought, the whole of mankind would be annihilated. I said that if the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist; in a number of years there would be 2,700 million people again and definitely more.<sup>7</sup>

Communist China asserts that "1. China wants peace, and not war; 2. It is the imperialists, and not we, who want to fight; 3. A world war can be prevented."<sup>8</sup>

It seems that although it has advocated revo-



lutionary wars, armed struggle, and the elimination of imperialist countries, Communist China has not claimed that a world war is inevitable. Nor has it sought such a war. Instead, statements like the one quoted above show more apprehension than aggressiveness. "It is they and not we who want to fight; . . . " Communist China's other apparently bellicose statements are of the same nature:

Should the U.S. imperialists invade China's mainland, we will take all necessary measures to defeat them. . . . With the defeat of U.S. imperialism, the time will come when imperialism and colonialism will be really liquidated throughout the world.<sup>9</sup>

Another charge against Communist China is that it "obviously underestimate[s] the whole danger of thermonuclear war" because it has contended that "the atomic bomb is a paper tiger" and is not terrible at all.<sup>10</sup>

Communist China has through the years advocated the "paper tiger" assumption. As early as 1938, Mao Tse-tung had said that "weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive."<sup>11</sup> This assumption was later extended to include nuclear weapons. In 1960, for instance, Communist China main-



tained that "the issue of a future war will not be decided by guided missiles or atom bombs. It will still be decided by man." Thus, "the revolutionary peoples are always able to find ways and means of overcoming every kind of modern weapons."<sup>12</sup>

The army and regular weapons are necessary to terminate war, to destroy the enemy, to occupy positions, and to win a victory. To rely on the army and regular weapons is to rely primarily on man. The final conclusion thus rests on men.<sup>13</sup>

The Chinese attitude remained unchanged after its first nuclear test in 1964.

The atomic bomb is a paper tiger. This famous statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung is known to all. This was our view in the past and this is still our view at present.<sup>14</sup>

However, the "men over weapons" or "paper tiger" arguments do not necessarily mean that Communist China does not understand the implications of nuclear weapons. In fact, as early as 1954, Communist China had warned its people that

with the appearance of the atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction, a new war will bring greater sacrifices of lives and material power beyond comparison with former wars.<sup>15</sup>

In 1961, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying advised his troops to learn how to preserve their lives in a nuclear attack.<sup>16</sup>



Communist China is particularly concerned about its vulnerable industrial and commercial centers which are concentrated in and limited to certain areas of the Chinese mainland.<sup>17</sup> In February 1964 Chou En-lai pointed out that "the imperialists and certain other persons unscrupulously have distorted China's position and made widespread propaganda about it." He pointed out that in a nuclear war Communist China would lose more people than would other countries.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, there is little reason to maintain that Communist China does not understand the implications of nuclear weapons. It fully realizes that the "paper tiger" is quite capable of becoming a "living tiger" or an "iron tiger."

However, it is one thing to say that Communist China does not want a world nuclear war, does not belittle the lives of human beings, and does not underestimate the mass destruction caused by nuclear weapons, and it is another to say that it will therefore not pursue its major foreign policy objectives. At present, since Communist China does not yet have an operational nuclear force, it probably will not try to change the present system through "revolutionary wars," which can help it establish its hegemony at



least in Asia and hence serve both its ideological and national interests.

It is over these "revolutionary wars" that the Communist Chinese are in conflict with the Russians. The Soviet Union particularly opposed the Chinese-sponsored "revolutionary wars" which, as mentioned earlier, resort only to armed force, violence, and "the barrel of a gun." The Soviet Union regards such "revolutionary wars" as highly dangerous because they might lead to a nuclear war.<sup>19</sup> The Soviet Union, therefore, strongly attacks the Chinese-sponsored revolutionary wars:

Revising the teaching of Marxist-Leninism, revising the general line of the Communist movement, the Chinese leaders are trying to impose on the international working class and the national liberation movement the theory of speeding revolution by means of "revolutionary wars."

They believe that only in this way can the socialist countries advance the cause of the revolution in the capitalist countries.<sup>20</sup>

In the view of the Soviet Union, peaceful transition of power during revolution should be encouraged and recognized.<sup>21</sup> Because non-peaceful methods are not the primary emphasis, the Soviet Union points out, there is no danger of a nuclear war in the Russian-sponsored revolutions.<sup>22</sup>



Communist China, however, finds the Soviet argument unconvincing. Instead, it urges "the oppressed peoples and nations" not to abandon their revolutions or refrain from waging revolutionary wars because of their fear of nuclear weapons.<sup>23</sup> What is more, Communist China claims that in revolutionary wars, there is no danger of a nuclear war:

In recent years, certain persons have been spreading the argument that a single spark from a war of national liberation or from a revolutionary people's war will lead to a world conflagration destroying the whole of mankind. What are the facts? . . . . Do not the facts demonstrate the absurdity of this argument?<sup>24</sup>

In comparison, it would appear that the Soviet Union is more cautious in this regard than is Communist China. Although the Chinese approach to revolutions does not necessarily indicate a Chinese lack of the fear of a nuclear war, it does suggest a dangerous attitude. For instance, if Communist China is really convinced that its "revolutionary wars" are in no danger of being escalated into a nuclear war, it might on some extreme occasions tend to encourage or support these wars to the very end with its conventional forces, and therefore neglect the danger of miscalculation and miscalculation which might readily lead to a nuclear war.



To what extent, however, or how vigorously would Communist China support the revolutionary wars in the world today? The Communist Chinese have often said that in a revolution self-reliance is necessary.

The people's armed force led by our party independently waged people's war on a large scale and won great victories without any material aid from outside, both during the more than eight years of the anti-Japanese war and during the more than three years of the people's war of liberation.<sup>25</sup>

They also maintain that a revolutionary war is doomed to failure if it relies entirely on foreign aid.

To make a revolution and to fight a people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the policy of self-reliance. . . . If one does not operate by one's own efforts . . . and does not rely on the strength of the masses but leans wholly on foreign aid--even though this be aid from socialist countries which persist in revolution--no victory can be won, or be consolidated even if it is won.<sup>26</sup>

But does this mean that Communist China would not actively support the "revolutionary war"? The answer is no! Communist China in fact has never denied the necessity of foreign aid and support in a revolutionary war. In 1935, for instance, Mao Tse-tung said that "international support is necessary for the revolutionary struggle today in any country



or of any nation."<sup>27</sup> Mao once admitted that it was a mistake to say that revolution was possible without outside aid because

in the epoch in which imperialism exists, it is impossible for a genuine people's revolution to win victory in any country without various forms of help from the international revolutionary forces.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, Communist China has already provided itself with a perfect rationale for giving support and aid to revolutionary wars in other countries. In fact, Communist China has maintained that its prime concern is to support revolutions:

There are two attitudes towards the national democratic revolutionary movement. The first is to maintain good relationships with the Western countries, giving no or little support to the national revolutionary movement. The second is to support the national movement as a general principle, with the possibility of having some contacts with the Western countries but only for secondary reasons. Our country adopted the latter attitude, with the firm resolution to support the national democratic revolutionary movement, and oppose colonialism and imperialism.<sup>29</sup>

Communist China also maintains that "it is a manifestation of the proletarian internationalism of the Chinese Communist Party when it gives full support to the constantly growing national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America."<sup>30</sup> To support revolutionary wars, therefore, is a Communist Chinese



obligation:

The CCP [Communist China] has always held that the socialist countries should support the people's revolutionary civil wars. To fail to do so would be to renounce their proletarian internationalist duty.<sup>31</sup>

In 1965, Lin Piao further pointed out that "those countries which have won victory are duty bound to support and aid the peoples who have not done so."<sup>32</sup> Even nuclear weapons should not change the obligation of the socialist countries to support revolutionary wars.<sup>33</sup> Thus, the Soviet Union's reluctance to support these wars has been referred to by Communist China as a "shameful betrayal of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist principles," and as appeasing the imperialists at the expense of the interests of the revolutionary people.<sup>34</sup>

Communist China's support and encouragement of revolutionary wars are by no means limited to verbal commitments. In the past years, it has indeed supported and encouraged revolutionary wars in the world, especially among Asian countries. These are a few examples:

(1) Vietnam: Communist China provides about seventy percent of the supplies North Vietnam receives from Communist countries. By 1967, there were a large



number of Chinese personnel, including soldiers, advisers, and railroad/highway maintainers in North Vietnam.<sup>35</sup> For example, during the month of September 1965, three Chinese regiments moved into North Vietnam from Yunnan Province in southern China. These troops usually moved into North Vietnam in battalions and then dispersed into companies upon arrival in order to avoid detection and at the same time carry out their assignments independently.<sup>36</sup>

(2) Thailand: The Thai National Liberation Front was established in 1952 with the support and assistance of Communist China. In 1954, Thai intelligence observed that there were already in Thailand 12,000 Communists equipped with Chinese artillery and other weapons. The Chinese also established a training center for Thai-communist guerrilla personnel and an ordnance factory near the Sino-Thai border to provide the Thai-communists with ammunition and weapons. In 1965, Chen Yi announced that guerrilla warfare in Thailand would start within one year.<sup>37</sup> On October 18, 1967, the Thai Minister of Interior Affairs told a press conference that there were many indications that Communist Chinese troops had already been in northern Thailand.<sup>38</sup> In 1968, Thai Air Marshal



Dawee Chullasapya, the deputy defense minister, stated that the Thai Communists had been trained in China. On January 11, 1969, Thai Premier Thanon claimed that Chinese Communists are Thailand's number one enemy.<sup>39</sup> Recently, Thai officials have been worried that Communist China might even be planning an armed invasion of northern Thailand, although some western observers have regarded the possibility as small.<sup>40</sup>

(3) India: Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, on April 24, 1969, reported to the Parliament that a group of rebellious Naga tribesmen had gone to Communist China to receive training and had returned with a large quantity of weapons. About 3,300 Nagas did apparently go to Communist China and at least 1,000 of them had returned with weapons. The rest planned to do so later. On February 6, in Naga, two rocket launchers provided by Communist China were discovered by Indian Security Forces.<sup>41</sup> In order to facilitate transport of supplies to rebellious areas in India and to put more pressure on the Indian government, Communist China has built many highways around India. Recently, through a joint Sino-Nepalese effort, the Kathmandu-Kodari highway was completed in 1967.



The Communist Chinese further agreed to help maintain the highway for two years<sup>42</sup> in order to legitimize their many activities in that area. Using this highway, Communist China control Nepal directly from Lhasa in Tibet and would thus constitute an open threat to India. In 1969, an agreement was signed between Pakistan and Communist China to build a road from Khun, in northern Kashmir, to the Khunjer Ab pass on the Kashmir-Sinkiang border. This road is connected to the Chinese road network in the Tibet-Sinkiang areas. The Indian government protested strongly to both governments and claimed that the road was built within Indian territory.<sup>43</sup> This highway, when completed, will enable Communist China to reach India and its neighboring areas quickly and easily.

In addition, it has been reported that Communist China has been training Indians at Hainan Island so that they can return to India to carry out guerrilla warfare.<sup>44</sup> In November 1969, Communist China openly published a letter from Charu Mazumdar, leader of the pro-Chinese faction of the Communist Party of India. In the letter, Mazumdar claimed that "China is, today, the source of inspiration for the revolutionary struggle



throughout the world."<sup>45</sup> As usual, Communist China tends to use others' statements to express its own views.

(4) Burma: There was some circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Communist Chinese were supporting a "Northeast Command" in Burma, composed mainly of hill tribes like the Shan, Kachin, and Karen.<sup>46</sup> Communist China openly called the Burmese Government "the brutal fascist rule of the reactionary Ne Win clique" and reported at length the guerrilla activities of the Burmese Communists.<sup>47</sup> Important personnel of the Communist Party of Burma were trained in China and a great many of them actually reside there.<sup>48</sup> An Indian report claims that approximately 5,000 troops from the Chinese Red Army are now in North Burma.<sup>49</sup>

(5) Cambodia: Apparently because of Communist Chinese subversive activities in his country, Cambodian head of state Prince Sihanouk on October 5, 1967, warned Communist China that any attempt to "produce rebellions would only rally Cambodia to the American cause and complete the isolation of China."<sup>50</sup> On January 16, 1969, Prince Sihanouk said that as a result of a police search, 50,000 hand grenades were discovered in a Chinese store. Two Chinese were arrested, both clearly



affiliated with Communist China's embassy in Cambodia.<sup>51</sup>

(6) Indonesia: Although many writers, including Vidya Prakash Dutt and Faud Hassan, seem to suggest that Communist China was behind the abortive coup of September 30, 1965, in Indonesia, the actual situation remains unclear.<sup>52</sup> However, after the coup, a large number of Indonesian Communists escaped to Communist China, and have reportedly been filtering back to Indonesia in recent years. On August 16, 1969, a report of the Antara News Agency said that a Chinese Communist Officer (Code Name TBT33) had been captured. He was found recruiting Indonesians to a secret training base near Bandung, East Java for guerrilla activities.<sup>53</sup>

(7) Malaysia: The Malaysian Communist Party has been supplied by Communist China with ammunition, weapons, and rations.<sup>54</sup> Its leader, Chen Ping, has often visited Communist China. The Malaysian government officially announced on November 9, 1968, that the Malaysian Communists were incited by Mao's thought and strategy. On November 16, the Malaysian Premier said that the Malaysian government had obtained



reliable evidence that Communist China had directed the subversive activities of the Malaysian Communists.<sup>55</sup> In a recent article, entitled "Raging Armed Struggle of the People in Asia, Africa and Latin America," Communist China reported "repeated new victories" scored by the Malayan National Liberation Army.<sup>56</sup>

(8) Laos: The communist party in Laos, the Laotian People's Party, has been assisted by Communist China in recent years. Communist China had by 1966 reportedly given at least 12,000 rifles, 50,000 hand grenades, and numerous pistols to Laotian Communists.<sup>57</sup> Young native Communist cadres were trained for subversion by the Communist Chinese in bases near Xieng Khouang and MOUNG SAI.<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, among the twenty members of the Intelligence and Planning Bureau, a decision-making organ of the Laotian People's Party, five are Communist Chinese.<sup>59</sup> The Laotian "neutralist" troops are actually a mixed force consisting of Chinese and Laotian minority groups trained by Communist China.<sup>60</sup> More significantly, the Yunnan-Lao highway which extends from Mengla in Chinese Yunnan province through Phone Saly, a Pathet Lao stronghold, was completed in 1969 by Communist Chinese workers. Construction work on another section



extending from Mount Sai to the Mekong River and the border of Thailand had already begun in September 1969.<sup>61</sup> This highway is strategically important because it allows Communist China to thrust from Yunnan province through northern Laos to Communist-infiltrated eastern Burma and northern Thailand. It also enables the Communist Chinese to control not only the Pathet Lao but also the pro-Communist Chinese neutralist troops. This, together with fifty-four similar main highways from Yunnan to various locations in Southeast Asia, could readily turn Yunnan province into a future "revolution" center.<sup>62</sup>

Regardless of its support and encouragement of these and other revolutionary wars, Communist China probably is not at present willing to contribute a large number of regular troops, on a scale similar to that of the Korean war, or use its token nuclear weapons to support these wars. In fact, Communist China has denied its direct involvement in these wars. For example, when it was recently asked by the Cambodian government to explain its intention of building the Lao-Yunnan highway in Laos, Communist China flatly denied its involvement with Laos at all, although in fact it had at least 3,000 road builders



there along with two infantry battalions equipped with anti-aircraft guns to protect the workers.<sup>63</sup> The main reason for the reluctance to give large-scale support might be that Communist China fears that open support with troops, let alone nuclear weapons, might provoke the United States or provide it with an excuse to launch an attack on Mainland China or the Chinese nuclear facilities. Evidence indicates that this fear dates from approximately 1954. In that year, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying warned his people to prepare against a sudden attack by the "imperialists", and admitted that in a nuclear war China's army would be in a comparatively backward position.<sup>64</sup> In 1964, after its first nuclear test, Communist China openly admitted that American nuclear forces in Asia were a threat to China's security.

Everybody knows that U.S. imperialism has been applying its nuclear threats to China and has even gone to the extent of placing nuclear weapons at the very doors of China. The U.S. Seventh Fleet carrying nuclear arms prowls up and down China's coastal waters. One U.S. nuclear base after another has been built around China. U.S. military and political chiefs have truculently threatened to drop nuclear bombs on China.<sup>65</sup>

Later, Communist China appeared to believe that the United States might be tempted to launch a sudden nuclear attack on China:



The perfidious imperialists are accustomed to launch sudden attacks in starting an aggressive war, and new techniques create more favorable conditions for carrying out sudden military attacks.<sup>66</sup>

In other statements, Communist China indicates that the United States must take the initiative in waging a war on China:

The Chinese people are ready to make all necessary sacrifices in the fight against imperialism. It is up to the U.S. President and the Pentagon to decide whether the United States wants a big war with China today, . . . If the imperialists are determined to launch a war of aggression against us, they are welcome to come sooner, to come as early as tomorrow. . . .

For sixteen years we have been waiting for the U.S. imperialists to come in and attack us. My hair has turned grey in waiting. Perhaps I will not have the luck to see the U.S. imperialist invasion of China, but my children may see it, and they will resolutely carry on the fight. Let no correspondent think that I am bellicose. It is the U.S. imperialists who are brutal and vicious and who bully others too much. . . . 67

It appears that Communist China still considers an American attack to be not only possible but feasible. In other words, Communist China might fear that attacking China is still a viable American option, especially under such circumstances as a massive and direct Chinese involvement in the "revolutionary war." It seems that this consideration has at least partially



contributed to the containment of Communist China  
in the past years.



Notes (Chpater V)

<sup>1</sup>"Open Letter from CPSU CC to Party Organizations and all Communists of the Soviet Union," Pravda, July 14, Soviet News, No. 4872 (July 17, 1963), 29-43, reprinted in William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), Document 3, 298-9.

<sup>2</sup>Ernst Henri, "Mao Tse-tung Gazes upon Five Continents," Atlas, Vol. 14 (December 1967), 15.

<sup>3</sup>Tsui Chui-yen, "Peiping's Design in Exploding its Nuclear Device," Issues and Studies, Vol. 1, No. 6 (March 1965), 18. "Soviet Government Statement--Reply to Statement Made by the Chinese Government," September 21, 1963, Soviet News, Nos. 4896 and 4897 (September 23-4, 1963), 159-174, reprinted in William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, Document 12, 445. See also Tsui Chui-yen, "Peiping's Design in Exploding Its Nuclear Device," Issues and Studies, Vol. 1, No. 6 (March 1965), 18.

<sup>4</sup>"Soviet Government Statement, August 21, 1963," Soviet News, No. 4885 (August 21, 1963), 103-109, reprinted in William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, Document 8, 366.

<sup>5</sup>Tsui Chui-yen, "Peiping's Design in Exploding Its Nuclear Device," 18.

<sup>6</sup>See Raymond L. Garthoff, "A Soviet Critique of China's 'Total Strategy'", The Reporter, Vol. XXXIV, No. 10 (May 19 1966), 49.

<sup>7</sup>See "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 21," September 1, 1963, Peking Review No. 36 (September 6, 1963), 7-16, reprinted in People of the World, 41-2. See also "Long Live Leninism!" Red Flag (April 16, 1960) and People's Daily, editorial, December 31, 1962.

<sup>8</sup>"Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government --A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 21," September 1, 1963, People of the World, Unite , for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 43. See also Peking Review, No. 44 (November 1, 1963), 19-20.



<sup>9</sup>"China is Determined to Make All Necessary Sacrifices for the Defeat of U.S. Imperialism," Peking Review, No. 41 (October 8, 1965), 14.

<sup>10</sup>"Open Letter from CPSU CC to Party Organizations and All Communists of the Soviet Union," 299.

<sup>11</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 239. See also his Selected Works, II (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1954), 192.

<sup>12</sup>Fu Chung, "Great Victories for Mao Tse-tung's Military Dialectics," People's Daily, October 6-7, 1960, quoted in Alice Langley Hsieh, "Communist China and Nuclear Force," The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons: Strategy and Politics, ed. R. N. Rsoecrance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 164. See also "Directive of the Military Affairs Commission Concerning the Thorough Implementation of the Combat Rules and Regulations and Instruction Manuals for Our Army," Bulletin of Activities, No. 29 (August 1, 1961) and "The Combat Rules and Regulations of Our Army Are The Product of Mao Tse-tung's Military Thought," Bulletin of Activities, No. 29 (August 1, 1961), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, ed. J. Chester Cheng, (Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1966), 727-729, 729-735.

<sup>13</sup>See "Speech of Comrade Yeh Chien-ying at the Training Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission," Bulletin of Activities, No. 10 (February 20, 1961), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, ed. J. Chester Cheng, 249-255.

<sup>14</sup>"Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," October 16, 1964, Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 3. See also People's Daily, December 31, 1964.

<sup>15</sup>Kuang-ming Jih-Pao, November 23, 1954, in SCMP, No. 934 (November 24, 1954), 13-4.

<sup>16</sup>See "Comrade Yeh Chien-ying's Summing-up Report to the First Conference of the Manuals Review Board of the Military Affairs Commission (Brief)" Bulletin of Activities, No. 26 (July 13, 1961), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army ed. J. Chester Cheng, 651-657.

<sup>17</sup>"Speech of Comrade Yeh Chien-ying at the Training Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission," 249-255.



<sup>18</sup>"Chou En-lai, Interview with Agence France Press, February 3, 1964," Peking Review, No. 7, (February 14, 1964), 16.

<sup>19</sup>See "Soviet Government Statement--Reply to Statement Made by the Chinese Government, September 21, 1963," 454-457.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 453.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 454-455.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 455.

<sup>23</sup>"Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace--Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (5)," Peking Review, No. 47 (November 27, 1963), 11-2.

<sup>24</sup>"A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement: The Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963," June 14, 1963 Peking Review, No. 25 (June 21, 1963), 14.

<sup>25</sup>Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," Peking Review (September 3, 1965), 9-31. The Communist Chinese claim that they had never received any foreign aids during the Chinese civil war is obviously untrue.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid. See also Mao Tse-tung, "Smash Chiang Kai-shek's Offensive by a War of Self-Defense," July 20, 1946, Selected Works, Vol. IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), 91.

<sup>27</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism," December 27, 1935, Selected Works, Vol. I (New York: International Publishers), 173.

<sup>28</sup>Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," June 30, 1949, Selected Works, Vol. IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), 416.

<sup>29</sup>"Source Material: Several Important Problems Concerning the Current International Situation" Bulletin of Activities, No. 17 (April 25, 1961), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, ed. J. Chester Cheng, 483.

<sup>30</sup>"Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 21," September 1, 1963, People of the World. . . ., 50.



<sup>31</sup>"Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace--Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (5)," Peking Review, No. 47 (November 27, 1963), reprinted in William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, 486.

<sup>32</sup>See Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War."

<sup>33</sup>See "Two Different Lines. . . ."

<sup>34</sup>See for example, People's Daily, August 8, 1958.

<sup>35</sup>Yin Ching-yao, "Hanoi-Peiping-Moscow" Wen-ti yi yuan-chu, Vol. 6, No. 6 (March, 1967), 46. Reportedly, there were several tens of thousands of Chinese personnel, but no exact figure was given.

<sup>36</sup>This information was based on a news dispatch from Agence France Press. Quoted in Chang Yao-chiu, "Peiping and the Vietnamese War," Wen-ti yi yuan-chu, Vol. 5, No. 1 (October, 1965), 52, 54.

<sup>37</sup>Chang Hu, "Thai Communists under Peiping's Nurture," Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly Vol. 12, No. 8 (October 1, 1969), 43-5.

<sup>38</sup>Lo Shih-fu, "How to Check Peiping's Aggression on the Indo-Burmese Border?" Wen-ti yi yuan-chu, Vol. 8, No. 1 (October, 1968), 56.

<sup>39</sup>"Peiping Supports Thai's People's Liberation Army" Facts and Features, Vol. II, No. 9 (February 19, 1969), 5. See also Coral Bell, "Security in Asia: Reappraisals after Vietnam," International Journal, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (Winter, 1968-9), 6; "Comments by Samuel B. Griffith II," China in Crisis, Vol. 2, ed. Tang Tsou (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 200; Frank E. Armbruster, "China's Conventional Military Capability," China in Crisis, Vol. 2, 181.

<sup>40</sup>"Laos: the Chinese Highwaymen," Time Magazine, (December 5, 1969), 50.

<sup>41</sup>See China Report, Vol. V, No. 2 (March-April, 1969), 47. Similarly, Life Magazine Bureau chief in New Dehli, Dan Coggin and correspondent James Shepherd also confirmed that about 1,000 to 3,000 Nagas were sent back to India



(continued)

through Kachin Hill by Communist China to carry out guerrilla activities. See International Affairs (Taipei), No. 657 (October 7, 1968), 21. A United Press news dispatch also said on February 14, 1970 that Burmese troops had been fighting Chinese trained Nagas rebels. A France Press news dispatch confirmed that thousands of rifles, rockets and other kinds of weapons were given to Nagas by Communist China to carry out guerrilla activities in India and Burma. See Central Daily News, February 16, 1970. On the other hand, Communist China over the past years, has consistantly warns Indians not to "play fire" and to "watch their heads." See for example, People's Daily, April 24, 1969. Similar warnings were given to Thailand and other non-Communist countries in Asia. See for example, People's Daily, November 20, 1969.

<sup>42</sup> See China Report, Vol. IV, No. 2 (March-April, 1968), 44. See also Chang Hu, "Relationship between the Chinese Communists and Nepal," Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly, Vol. 12, No. 7 (September 1, 1969), 52-3. Other sources also confirm the existence and military significance of these highway. For example, one report points out that "Yunnan is a key strategic hub and if ever the South-east Asia war escalated, would be a principal take-off point for Chinese armies bound into Indochina and also into Burma, the classical southward invasion route." See "China's Motionless Army," New York Times, May 6, 1966. Another report said that "Communist China has built a road across the northern tip of Laos which effectively "nips off" the province of Phong Saly [of Laos]. This province now is heavily under Chinese influence." Information in this report was provided by a senior U.S. official. See Edmonton Journal, March 24, 1969. Still another report points out that "by far the most successful project undertaken by Peking in recent years is the Katmandu-Kodari "Chinese highway", which connects the Nepalese capital with Tibet." See Newsweek, March 16, 1970.

While it is true that these highways can be used in both directions, it is very doubtful that countries in Southeast Asia have sufficient military capability such as ground troops and weapons to



(continued)

match the Chinese force.

<sup>43</sup>"India-China Relations June-July 1969," China Report, Vol. V, No. 5 (September-October, 1969), 36.

<sup>44</sup>"Comments by Samuel B. Griffith II," 200. See also Coral Bell, "Security in Asia," 6-7.

<sup>45</sup>"Developing Revolutionary War to Eliminate Aggressive War," Peking Review, No. 48 (November 28, 1969), 18.

<sup>46</sup>"China: Politics," Far East Economic Review Yearbook 1969, 135-142. See also Coral Bell, "Security in Asia," 6 - 7; "The Maoists Support Rebellious Activities of the Burmese Communist Party," Fact & Features, Vol. II, No. 14 (April 30, 1969), 7.

<sup>47</sup>"Burmese People's Armed Forces Growing Stronger in Struggle," Peking Review, No. 36 (September 3, 1969), 14

<sup>48</sup>"The Maoists Support Rebellious Activities of the Burmese Communist Party," 8.

<sup>49</sup>See China Report, Vol. V. No. 1 (January-February, 1969), 39.

<sup>50</sup>See China Report, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January-February, 1968), 43.

<sup>51</sup>Lo Shih-fu, "The Paris Talks and Peiping's Policy of Southward Expansion," Wen-ti yi yuan-chu, Vol. 8, No. 6 (March, 1969), 20.

<sup>52</sup>Dutt and Hassan tended to believe that Communist China was greatly involved in the coup. For details, see Vidya Prakash Dutt, China and the World: An Analysis of Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 327; Faud Hassan "Prospects for Relations between Indonesia and Communist China: An Indonesian View," Current Scene, Vol. VI, No. 19, (November 4, 1968), 17-8. For opposing view, see Richard Lowenthal, "Communist China's Foreign Policy," China in Crisis, Vol. 2, 3.; "Comments by Roderick MacFarguhar," China in Crisis, Vol. 2, 19; and John Hughes, "China and Indonesia: The Romance That Failed," Current Scene, Vol. VI, No. 19, (November 4, 1968), 2-4. For Communist China's reaction to the coup, see People's Daily, October 20, 1965.



<sup>53</sup>Lo Shih-fu, "Chinese Communist Thrust Into the Southeast Asia," Issues & Studies Vol. VI, No. 1 (October, 1969), 41.

<sup>54</sup>Chang Yao-chiu, "Peiping's Subversive Activities in Malaysia," Wen-ti yi yuan-chu, Vol. 8, No. 4 (January, 1969), 47-9.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

<sup>56</sup>"Raging Armed Struggle of the People in Asia, Africa and Latin America," Peking Review, No. 36 (September 3, 1969), 28-30. Similar accounts were given of activities in Laos, Thailand, Mozambique, and others.

<sup>57</sup>Chang Hu, "A General Study of the Relations between the Chinese and the Laotian Communists," Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly, Vol. 12, No. 9 (November 1, 1969), 35-7.

<sup>58</sup>Lo Shih-fu, "Chinese Communist Thrust into Southeast Asia," 39.

<sup>59</sup>Lo Shih-fu, "Strategic and Tactical Problems of the Laotian Communists," Issues & Studies Vol. VI, No. 4 (January, 1970), 42.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., 48.

<sup>61</sup>For details about this highway and its strategic implications, see "Laos: The Chinese Highwaymen," 47. See also "Chinese Communist Thrust into Southeast Asia," 37-40. Also "The Paris Talks and Peiping's Policy of Southward Expansion," 20-1.

<sup>62</sup>Communist China has supported and encouraged revolutions elsewhere. For details, see for example, Gay Wint, Communist China's Crusade: Mao's Road to Power and the New Campaign for World Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1965), 20ff.

<sup>63</sup>"Laos: The Chinese Highwaymen," 47. See also New York Times, May 6, 1966; Edmonton Journal, March 24, 1969, Los Angeles Times Service from Saigon; Edmonton Journal, September 3, 1969, New York Times Service; for other aspects of Chinese aid to North Vietnam and Vietcongs, see New York Times, January 17, 1965; Edmonton Journal, April 13, 1970.

<sup>64</sup>See Yeh Chien-yin's speech on July 27, 1955, NCNA, July 27, 1955, Current Background, No. 347 (August 23, 1955), 29-31.



<sup>65</sup>"Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons," People's Daily, October 22, 1964, editorial, reprinted in Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons, 13. In this statement, Communist China apparently had exaggerated the "nuclear threat" of the United States. For one thing, the United States does not have these "nuclear bases" in Asia.

<sup>66</sup>Liu Yun-cheng, "The Role of People's Militia," Peking Review, No. 6 (February 5, 1965), 19.

<sup>67</sup>"China is Determined to Make All Necessary Sacrifices for the Defeat of U.S. Imperialism," Peking Review, No. 41 (October 8, 1965), 14. See also "Peking's Obsession: Nuclear War with the U.S. Is Inevitable-Red China's Foreign Minister Plainly Lays Out An Ominous View," The National Observer, November 28, 1966, 26. Underline mine.



## CHAPTER VI

### COMMUNIST CHINA AS AN OPERATIONAL NUCLEAR POWER AND ITS NUCLEAR STRATEGY

When Communist China becomes an operational nuclear power, a new type of nuclear deterrence between Communist China on the one hand, and one or both of the superpowers on the other, will emerge. So far both superpowers have been able to maintain a relatively stable international system. The United States, for example, has played a significant role in the maintenance of world security and stability, especially in Asia. Thus in 1964, immediately after Communist China conducted its first nuclear test, U.S. President Johnson assured American allies in Asia that the American commitments there would be honored, and announced at the same time that "nations that do not seek nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need United States support against the threat of nuclear blackmail, they will have it."<sup>1</sup> Since 1960, the Soviet Union has refused to support or encourage Chinese nuclear development. In fact the Russian attitude has changed over the past years from apparent indifference to indirect attack and then to open attack of Communist China's nuclear development.<sup>2</sup>



However, it is questionable whether the present deterrence will remain effective once Communist China possesses an operational nuclear force. In that event, it is doubtful that the United States would be willing to continue to honor its present commitments in Asia. Johnson's guarantee was not mentioned after 1964. In fact, on July 19, 1967, one month after the sixth Chinese test was conducted, American Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced that the guarantees mentioned by Johnson in 1964 would only be discussed again in Geneva, where the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty would be negotiated, or in the Security Council of the United Nations.<sup>3</sup> On April 26, 1968, Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. ambassador to the General Assembly, stated that

in the view of the United States, aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear state would create a qualitative new situation--a situation in which the nuclear-weapon states which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the United Nations Charter.<sup>4</sup>

It appears that the United States has gradually reduced its commitments to defend, by itself, the security of Asian countries against a possible Chinese



nuclear threat. Instead, it would prefer to see an international body assume the responsibility.

The United States is by no means the only country proposing such a U.N. guarantee. The ideal of a "Multilateral assurance through the United Nations" has long been sponsored by others.<sup>5</sup> In 1966, for example, Frank Aiken, the Irish foreign Minister said:

I have already indicated my conviction that armed resistance to aggression by individual states or by limited group alliance is ceasing to give them the assurance of permanent security against attack by a great nuclear power. This assurance, in my opinion, can only be given in the nuclear missile age with the maximum of credibility by a world wide system of collective security based on a United Nations peace-guarantor force composed of lightly armed troops drawn from the non-nuclear Members, and backed by a combined force supplied by the nuclear powers who have bound themselves to oppose aggression by a nuclear power on a non-nuclear State.<sup>6</sup>

This U.N. guarantee, if possible and effective, is of course desirable. Unfortunately, however, it does not seem to be very likely. Because of the impotence of the United Nations' own collective security system, the ineffectiveness of the Security Council because of the use of veto power, and the other organizational weakness and political problems in the United



Nations, an effective U.N. guarantee is beyond present attainment. The United Nations has yet to make any visible progress in this direction.

However, a joint U.S.-Soviet guarantee for the security of Asian countries has been proposed.<sup>7</sup> The alleged significance of this "joint guarantee" is that it would not juxtapose the great powers.<sup>8</sup> This joint guarantee seems feasible to Raymond Aron because he believes that "the big powers will act jointly to restrain potential troublemakers, even those armed with nuclear weapons."<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, to realize such a joint guarantee, the superpowers do not need over-all cooperation.<sup>10</sup> However, such optimism seems unwarranted. True, in recent years, there has been some limited cooperation between the superpowers, e.g., their joint efforts in the neutralization of Laos, in the mediation of the Indian-Pakistan war of 1965 and the later Tashkent agreement, their meetings in Glassboro and Camp David, and their common effort in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Nevertheless, the scope of their cooperation is still limited. Basic conflicts of interest between the superpowers are still quite real. It is therefore extremely unlikely



that the Soviet Union would agree to a joint guarantee of security of South Vietnam; nor is it likely that the United States would agree to a guarantee with the Russians of the security of North Vietnam. In this regard, Stanley Hoffmann seems correct when he points out:

As long as the bipolar contest persists, one may doubt the willingness of each super power to give an assurance to non-nuclear allies or clients of the other, against a former or dissident ally, and thus to consecrate formally the fiasco of the original alliance, and perhaps even to consolidate the rival's hold on an area.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, it is very doubtful that a "joint guarantee" would be a feasible solution to the problem of security in Asia.

Even if such a guarantee for security were offered by the superpowers, it would still be doubtful that it would be effective in deterring a possible Chinese nuclear attack.

Unless the guarantees have a terrifying degree of automaticity and certainty--i.e., promise nuclear retaliation against the state that uses nuclear weapons first on an adversary--they may have little deterrent effect on a state that may hope to knock out its foe in a single blow, and then turn to the guarantors and point out to them the vanity of further bloodshed, or plead that it was provoked.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, the credibility of such a guarantee, if



it were at all possible, would still present a serious problem. The Asian countries might doubt that the United States or the Soviet Union could stop or deter a Chinese nuclear attack in time to save their countries from destruction. It would certainly be useless to rescue a ruined land. Furthermore, some Asians believe that Communist China tends to take military action against its enemies when both superpowers are occupied by other crises in the world. They believe, for instance, that Communist China decided to attack India in October 1962 because it calculated that while the superpowers were engaged in the Cuban crisis, they would not be able to intervene in Asian affairs.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, even presuming that there was a guarantee, the superpowers still might not be able to honor it.

Therefore, the only way to "guarantee" security would be "an American presence, complete with missiles and/or planes," which "would undoubtedly have a very salutary effect, particularly in psychological terms, on the credibility problem."<sup>14</sup> But then, such a "trip wire" situation<sup>15</sup> would be extremely dangerous because a Chinese attack of a guaranteed country would be tantamount to attacking the United States. Conse-



quently it would be physically impossible for the United States to avoid involvement in a war with Communist China. It is very doubtful that either superpower would be willing to risk putting itself into such a situation.

In addition, the United States will be in an uncomfortable position when Communist China has an operational nuclear force and is in a position to attack many of the American bases in Asia. If Communist China were to attack a country whose security was guaranteed by the United States, the Americans would have to take into consideration the possibility that retaliation on their part might provoke a Communist Chinese nuclear attack on U.S. bases in Asia, and hence ignite a Sino-American nuclear war or possibly a world nuclear war. The United States would certainly not be willing to accept the consequences of such a war.

Thus, when Communist China becomes an operational nuclear power, the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrence imposed by the superpowers in Asia would significantly diminish. The situation in Asia might become even more unstable if the United States no longer considered it expedient to keep its military



commitments in Asia, particularly in South and Southeast Asia. Consequently, it might decide to withdraw from this area, rather than confront a nuclear China.

Furthermore, as the Chinese nuclear capability grows, Communist China itself appears to feel that the superpowers' nuclear deterrence is becoming less effective.<sup>16</sup> Thus an announcement was made following each Chinese nuclear test, claiming that it was a further encouragement of revolutionary wars. In 1964, for instance, after its first test, Communist China declared:

The mastering of the nuclear weapons by China is a great encouragement to the revolutionary peoples of the world in their struggles.<sup>17</sup>

At the same time, it said:

China is a socialist country. It has always decided its foreign policy in conformity with the interest of the Chinese people, the socialist camp, the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, . . . . The 15 year history of New China proves that in the struggle against the imperialist policies of aggression and war, for supporting the revolutionary movements of all peoples and safeguarding world peace, socialist China can be fully trusted.<sup>18</sup>

After its third test, on May 9, 1966, Communist



China apparently showed even more interest in relating its nuclear testing to the encouragement of revolutionary wars:

China has got atom bombs and guided missiles, and she now has the hydrogen bomb. This greatly heightens the morale of the revolutionary people throughout the world and greatly deflates the arrogance of imperialism, modern revisionism and all reactionaries.<sup>19</sup>

It is significant to note, however, that not until November 1966 did Communist China in its nuclear test statements specifically encourage any particular revolution. To some people, this omission indicated Communist China's caution. In an article in The New York Times, for instance, John W. Finney pointed out:

Through the Peking statements have run the theme that the atomic tests represent a key step in China's progress toward great-power status and an increase in China's national defense capability. But the statements were found [by Alice Langley Hsieh] to be "cautious in assessing the military implications" of the tests.

For example, Peking has emphasized that China's mastering of nuclear weapons technology is a great encouragement to the revolutionary peoples of the world. The Chinese leaders, however, avoided any specific application of this principle to concrete situations, such as in Vietnam or Laos, . . .<sup>20</sup>

If Hsieh and Finney's analysis is correct, which it probably is, then Communist China's estimate of the



significance of its nuclear weapons capability increased after November 1966. Thus on November 15, one month after its fourth test, Communist China began to claim that "the possession by the Chinese people of guided missiles, and nuclear weapons is a great encouragement to the heroic Vietnamese people who are waging a war of resistance. . . . This influence of China's cannot be checked."<sup>21</sup> Thus "a specific application," that is, the encouragement of a particular revolution, was presented. In June 1967, after its sixth nuclear test, Communist China further claimed:

It is a very great encouragement and support to the Vietnamese people in their heroic war against United States aggression and for national salvation, to the Arab people in their resistance to aggression by the United States and British imperialists and their tool, Israel, and to the revolutionary people of the whole world.<sup>22</sup>

In October 1969, after it successfully conducted two more nuclear tests, Communist China again specifically named several revolutions to encourage:

These new achievements in China's development of nuclear weapons. . . are a great encouragement and support to the heroic Vietnamese people who are courageously carrying on the war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, to Laotian people who are fighting against the armed invasion by U.S. imperialism and the reactionaries of Thailand, to the Palestinian and other Arab people who are resisting the U.S. imperialist and Zionist aggression, and to the people of all countries who are fighting people's liberation.<sup>23</sup>



These statements indicate that Communist China feels that as its nuclear weapons capability increases, a new type of deterrence, more to its advantage than the previous deterrence, is being developed, especially in Asia. Therefore, pro-Chinese revolutionary elements might be put in a position where they could initiate revolutionary wars without being troubled by the threat of hostile intervention, even on the part of the United States. Thus revolutionary activity in Asia might be substantially increased. Communist China might also intensify its military and material aid to these revolutionary elements. Already, North Vietnam has claimed that the Chinese nuclear tests were a great encouragement to its struggle against U.S. aggression.<sup>24</sup> The Laotian Patriotic Front claimed that the Chinese tests had been a powerful inspiration to its cause of fighting the United States. The Communist Party of Malaya described the tests as a "tremendous encouragement and a powerful support to struggle for national liberation." The Communist Party of Thailand declared that they were an immense encouragement to the people of Thailand who are struggling against imperialism. Similarly the Ceylonese Communist Party



regarded the tests as an encouragement and "support" to all "oppressed peoples" struggling for their liberation.<sup>25</sup> Many anti-Communist countries fear that the Chinese nuclear weapons development might encourage revolutionary wars in Asia. For example, Thai Premier Thanon and Malayan Deputy Premier Razak both stated that the tests would encourage other communist subversive activities.<sup>26</sup>

At the same time, Communist China's nuclear weapons development has also caused fear among other Asian countries. For example, P.K. Banerjee, Minister of the Indian Embassy in Washington, said that Communist China's nuclear test had brought a "sense of insecurity and offensive threat, not only to India but to many neighboring countries."<sup>27</sup> The Indian Prime Minister, Shastri, pointed out that it was necessary to have some guarantee from the superpowers for the security of India.<sup>28</sup> A Ceylonese newspaper asked, "has the performance of the Chinese lately in crossing the Himalayan passes already become a dim memory?"<sup>29</sup> Japanese Prime Minister Sato said that the Communist Chinese nuclear test increased the importance of a nuclear guarantee for the security of other



Asian countries.<sup>30</sup> "China with a nuclear capability is, as far as Japan is concerned, a threat."<sup>31</sup> Cambodian expressed its fear in its recurrent statements reminding Communist China that it "has solemnly declared that it will never be the first to use these weapons of mass destruction."<sup>32</sup> The Asian countries' fear of a nuclear China might have the following consequences. First, these countries might become reluctant to resist Chinese-sponsored revolutionary wars in their countries. Secondly, they might consider it expedient to join in the Chinese hegemony and follow the Chinese line of policy. Thirdly, they might accede to Chinese demands without resistance in events such as border disputes. As Sisir Gupta points out:

China may subject a non-nuclear India to periodic blackmail, weaken its people's spirit of resistance and self-confidence and thus achieve without a war its major political objectives in Asia. India's experience with China suggests that such a course of action is not only possible but probable.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, when Communist China becomes an operational nuclear power, its blackmail policy might become effective in Asia.

With an operational nuclear force, Communist China might also attempt limited military actions in Asia,



similar to the occupation of Aksai Chin at the time of the Sino-Indian war. If the war in Vietnam continues to such a time or if new fighting were to start in Korea, Communist China might even send its "voluntary" troops into these areas. It might also send regular troops across its borders into countries like Thailand and Burma either to openly support revolutionary wars or to occupy territory. It might also launch a conventional attack on Quemoy or Taiwan to eliminate the Nationalist Chinese, an action it has vowed to take ever since 1949.

Through nuclear blackmail, Communist China might also try to force Asian countries to remove U.S. bases from their territories. The removal of U.S. bases from Asia has been one of Communist China's objectives since 1949. Before its first nuclear test, however, Communist China had employed an "Asian nuclear-free zone" strategy. At that time it advocated the establishment of a "nuclear-weapon-free zone of the Asian and Pacific Region" in which all countries would be required to

dismantle all military bases, including nuclear bases, on foreign soil, and withdraw from abroad all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. . . [and to] establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone of the Assian and Pacific region, including the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. . . . 34



Once this "zone" was established, the super-powers' nuclear forces would be withdrawn from Asia, and their deterrent effect on Communist China would be significantly reduced.

Apparently, Communist China decided to change its strategy after its 1964 nuclear test. It probably judged that the establishment of a "nuclear-free zone" in Asia would also prohibit its own nuclear tests. Thus on November 22, 1964, Communist China began to question the usefulness of this zone, which it had previously supported:

Many countries at present are keenly interested in the establishment of nuclear-free zones. However to really free the nuclear-free zones from the threats of nuclear war it is first necessary for the nuclear powers to undertake not to use nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the establishment of nuclear-free zones would be impossible and even if they be set upon in name, all it means is that the non-nuclear countries would be deprived of their legitimate right to develop nuclear weapons to resist the nuclear menace and be bound hand and foot.<sup>35</sup>

The purpose of this new strategy is obvious. If such a pledge was made by the superpowers, their nuclear deterrence on China would be greatly reduced, even if there was not a "nuclear-free zone" in Asia. However, since Communist China appears to realize that the superpowers would not give such a pledge, it has used another strategy to remove U.S. bases from Asia. On



November 24, 1964, for instance, after Japanese Prime Minister Sato decided to permit U.S. nuclear submarines in Japanese ports, Communist China warned:

The closer the Japan-U.S. collaboration, the less guaranteed is Japan's security. Today U.S. imperialism is brandishing its nuclear weapons in Asia, making active preparations for a nuclear war. If it eventually starts such a war, Japan, as a U.S. nuclear base, is bound to bear the brunt and will inevitably be pushed into the abyss of nuclear calamity. The Japanese Government willingly acts as an accomplice in U.S. imperialism's nuclear war preparations--this is an extremely dangerous road by which the Japanese nation is led to a bottomless nuclear schism. Precisely because of this, the Japanese people have unfolded a vigorous mass struggle opposing entry of U.S. nuclear submarines and opposing turning Japan into a U.S. nuclear war base by the U.S.-Japanese reactionaries.<sup>36</sup>

Communist China might also use potential threats to prevent Asian countries from becoming allies of either superpower. At present, although Communist China has only a token nuclear capability, it has already tended to use this strategy towards Japan;

Placing itself [Japan] under the wing of U.S. imperialism, working hand in glove with Soviet revisionism. . . and acting as the vanguard in opposing China, the reactionary Sato government will. . . end shamelessly in being buried together with U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism.<sup>37</sup>

If the United States indeed decided to remove its bases from Asia, or even to withdraw its commitment from Asia, the deterrence it has imposed on Communist



China would be further eroded. As mentioned earlier, without the presence of U.S. force in Asia, the credibility of American guarantee if there is still any, over Asian countries' security would be seriously reduced. Furthermore, it might be too late for the United States to save a victim of a Chinese nuclear attack. Thus, behind its nuclear umbrella, Communist China's huge ground force could become a very effective instrument in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. At present, Communist China has an army of 2,250,000 men in 115 divisions. It also has four armoured divisions and one or two airborne divisions. In addition, it has a militia of 250 million men and women, well trained for ground combat, guerrilla warfare, close combat and night fighting.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, they would be most effective in Thailand, Malaysia, Laos, Vietnam, and Burma where jungles, cliffs and swamps make the terrain suitable for guerrilla warfare. The highways mentioned previously would make transportation of supplies and troops easier than it has been in the past.<sup>39</sup> In addition, there is evidence that Communist China is prepared to equip its ground troops with tactical nuclear weapons and may well considering their battlefield use.



As Alice Langley Hsieh points out,

Units above the regimental level were being instructed not only in defence but also in the principles of using atomic . . . weapons, and even in methods of exploiting the results of Chinese-initiated surprise attacks with atomic. . . weapons. Consequently, it must be assumed that the Chinese are already considering the battlefield use of nuclear weapons.<sup>40</sup>

It may be suggested that Asian countries could still unite in order to halt any possible future Communist Chinese aggression or Chinese-sponsored revolutionary wars in Asia.<sup>41</sup> The possibility of this collective "defense", unfortunately, appears to be rather small. In the first place, there are various conflicts and tensions among countries in Asia, e.g. between Pakistan and India, among Indonesia-Malaysia-the Philippines, between Malaysia and Singapore, and among Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam. In the second place, the foreign policies of these countries are entirely different, ranging from completely anti-Communist (Nationalist China, South Vietnam, South Korea) to pro-Communist Chinese "non-aligned" (Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, and until very recently, Cambodia). In the third place, most Asian countries are incapable of defending themselves without outside assistance. The combination of weaknesses among these



countries does not necessarily mean strength. Only India, Indonesia, and Japan are strong in relation to Communist China. But both India and Indonesia have been plagued by many domestic and foreign problems and have been weakened in recent years. As far as Japan is concerned, most Asian countries probably still remember vividly the Japanese invasion and aggression in Asia during the Second World War. Their fear of a strong Japan might therefore rule out any possibility of supporting Japan as their leader in Asia against Communist China.

Writers such as Alastair Buchan then suggest that the Asian countries could arm themselves with nuclear weapons to balance the nuclear capability of Communist China.<sup>42</sup> At present, there are two countries in Asia which might employ this alternative: Japan and India.

India has long been a country opposed to a domestic nuclear weapons program. In 1961 Prime Minister Nehru announced that under no circumstances would India develop nuclear weapons.<sup>43</sup> However, by 1965, there seemed to be a change of Indian position in this regard. Prime Minister Shastri said at the Indian National Congress of that year that "I do not



know what may happen later, but our present policy is not to build an atom bomb, and it is the right policy."<sup>44</sup> Apparently, India's position was no longer as rigid as it had been. Then , in September 1968, after Communist China conducted its seventh test, the Indian Defense Studies and Analysis Institute urged the Indian government to build up the necessary facilities for future nuclear weapons development.<sup>45</sup> Noted experts, such as Leonard Beaton, even said that India might already have begun the design of a plutonium bomb.<sup>46</sup> A report in January 1970 says that there are persistent demands from within the India's ruling Congress Party for an Indian nuclear weapon program and the Indian government is now studying the cost of building such a system.<sup>47</sup>

As far as Japan is concerned, it especially does not want to fall too far behind Communist China in nuclear weapons development.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, although Japan is a party of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a nuclear weapons program probably will remain as a serious alternative for Japan. Furthermore, Japan is technologically capable of developing such weapons. In 1969, to the surprise of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, the Japanese Science



and Technology Agency announced that Japanese scientists had developed new techniques for the production of enriched uranium.<sup>49</sup> In 1970, the finance minister of Japan announced that Japan's defence spending will take its sharpest rise since the Second World War. Premier Eisaku Sato also claimed that the possession of nuclear weapons would not violate the anti-military spirit of the Japanese constitution, and that Japan must take greater responsibility for its defence.<sup>50</sup> It appears that Joseph Alsop of Los Angeles Times Service is correct when he said that Japan will embark on an independent course and soon thereafter take the necessary steps to become a nuclear power."<sup>51</sup>

Thus, both India and Japan will become a nuclear powers when Communist China possesses an operational nuclear force. When this happens, there will be even less guarantee of stability and security in Asia. In the first place, if Communist China, India, and Japan became operational nuclear powers, there might be a rapid nuclear proliferation in Asia or even in the world. If Buchan was correct when he said that "the biggest gap in the chain reaction of proliferation may be from the fifth to the sixth nuclear



powers," the, proliferation would become inevitable.<sup>52</sup>

He also pointed out that as a result of the Chinese nuclear weapons development, many Asian countries might seek to become nuclear countries themselves.

Once this takes place, "there could be no assurance that it would not spread to the Middle East and to Europe."<sup>53</sup> U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara also

said:

I want to emphasize the dangers of nuclear spread that were dramatized by the detonation at Lop Nor [i.e. Chinese test site]. Nuclear technology is advancing so rapidly that the cost of building a minimum nuclear capability, cost whether measured in terms of capital expenditure, human skills, or the time required to achieve that capability, is decreasing dramatically. Nuclear spread, therefore, is one of the greatest dangers facing the world today.<sup>54</sup>

McNamara's warning is by no means unrealistic. At present, in Asia, many countries which are very sensitive to the Chinese, Indian, or Japanese nuclear weapons developments, such as Pakistan, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam, Nationalist China, and Australia all possess power reactors and have started advanced nuclear research.<sup>55</sup> Either out of fear or pride, or both, they might well decide to develop their own nuclear weapons when Communist China, Japan, and India become operational nuclear powers. Further nuclear proliferation would



then become inevitable. In the second place, there are many tense local conflicts and potential conflicts in Asia: between Pakistan and India, between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, and between Cambodia and Vietnam or Thailand. There are also potential dangers and conflicts among Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. If these countries were to become nuclear countries and hence become more confident of their strength and capability, settlement of their conflicts might become more difficult. Since none of them could expect to have invulnerability or near invulnerability like the superpowers have, one country might be tempted to launch a preemptive nuclear attack on its enemies in order to eliminate them once and for all or to destroy their nuclear facilities before they could become too powerful to deal with. As Herman Kahn points out:

An irresponsible, desperate, or determined decision maker might not waste time on the lower rungs of the escalation ladder. He might simply launch a disarming attack on his victim and present the world with a fait accompli. Even if the potential victim has a nuclear capability, it may not have enough second-strike capability to deter such an attack.<sup>56</sup>

Similar temptation might also exist between Communist China and many Asian countries. For example, if a very hostile India or Thailand were becoming an operational



nuclear power, Communist China might be tempted to launch a nuclear attack on the country before it could become a nuclear threat to China.

When Communist China becomes an operational or major nuclear power, the superpowers' self-restraints in the nuclear arms race might also be seriously affected. As mentioned earlier, both superpowers have watched each other's nuclear capability very closely. Thus in 1966, when there were signs that the Soviet Union was developing an effective ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile), the United States immediately accelerated its nuclear weapons program to ensure its own "penetration capability."<sup>57</sup> The superpowers therefore have maintained a very delicate balance of nuclear capability between themselves. However, neither superpower has been willing to risk an unlimited arms race by wholeheartedly attempting to develop an invulnerable nuclear force.

However, after Communist China successfully tested a nuclear-missile combination and its hydrogen bomb, many Americans started to fear a potential Chinese nuclear threat. For example, U.S. Senator Henry Jackson, a Congressional spokesman on U.S. defense, feared that Communist China might be able to launch a



nuclear attack on the United States earlier than expected.<sup>58</sup> After the Chinese sixth test on June 17, 1967, many senior U.S. military analysts began to feel the need for an ABM system.<sup>59</sup> In the same year, U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that the United States had decided to deploy a "limited anti-ballistic-missile system" against a possible ICBM threat from Communist China.<sup>60</sup> He particularly pointed out that "the deployment will foreclose any possibility of a successful Chinese nuclear attack on the United States and will thereby provide assurance of our determination to support our Asian friends against Chinese nuclear blackmail."<sup>61</sup> On August 6, 1969, the United States officially decided to develop its ABM program. One of the main reasons given by President Nixon for this decision was the "defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade."<sup>62</sup>

Nevertheless, the question remains: how long can this "limited" or "thin" ABM system remain effective? In view of the rapid nuclear development in Communist China, a "limited" ABM system might become ineffective before long. In order to keep up



with the Chinese nuclear development, the United States will have to constantly increase its ABM system's strength. Eventually, the system would become a "thick" one. If the Soviet Union wants to maintain the balance of nuclear capability, as it certainly would, it would also have to develop a "thick" ABM system. Consequently, a rapid arms race might take place between the superpowers. But as a group of prominent scholars, including Hans J. Morgenthau, Arthur Larson, and Edmund A. Gullison, have pointed out, a further anti-ballistic development could trigger a costly and potentially suicidal arms race with the Soviet Union.<sup>63</sup>

The situation might be aggravated by the fact that Communist China is regarded as a potential enemy by both superpowers. Thus when Communist China possesses an operational nuclear force, either superpower might be tempted to increase its nuclear capability to the degree that the nuclear force of Communist China and the other superpower could be matched and therefore deterred. Consequently, a rapid nuclear armed race among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China will become inevitable.



## Notes (Chapter VI)

<sup>1</sup>For text of Johnson's statement, see New York Times, October 17, 1964.

<sup>2</sup>For a discussion of Russian reactions during these years, see Fei Yuan "Peiping-Moscow New Struggle and Chinese Communist Nuclear Blackmail," Wen-ti-yi yuan-chu, Vol. 4, No. 2, (November 1964), 28-34. See also New York Times, May 15, 1965, and July 4, 1967.

<sup>3</sup>For a detailed analysis, see "Ban on Nuclear Proliferation and Peiping's H-bomb Test," Wen-ti yi yuan-chu, Vol. 7, No. 1 (October, 1967), 54-56.

<sup>4</sup>Arthur J. Godberg, "U.S. Calls for Prompt Endorsement by the General Assembly of the Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," The Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Department of State Publication 8385 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Off., 1968), 8.

<sup>5</sup>See Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: UNA-USA, 1967), 21.

<sup>6</sup>U.N. Document A/C.1/PV.1441, November 3, 1966.

<sup>7</sup>See New York Times, October 18, October 24, November 24, and December 5, 1964.

<sup>8</sup>See R. N. Rosecrance, Problem of Nuclear Proliferation (Los Angeles: University of California, 1966), 58. See also Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 20.

<sup>9</sup>Raymond Aron, The Great Debate (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 62.

<sup>10</sup>See R. N. Rosecrance, Problem of Nuclear Proliferation, 59.

<sup>11</sup>Stanley Hoffmann, "Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics," A World of Nuclear Powers? ed. Alastair Buchan (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 113. See also Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 20-21.



<sup>12</sup>Stanley Hoffmann, "Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics," 114.

<sup>13</sup>See Sisir Gupta, "The Indian Dilemma," A World of Nuclear Powers?, 62-63

<sup>14</sup>Robert L. Rothstein, On Nuclear Proliferation (New York: Columbia University, 1966). 60.

<sup>15</sup>See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 6, 119, 138, 192, especially 187ff.

<sup>16</sup>For further discussion, see infra, Chapter 6.

<sup>17</sup>New York Times, October 17, 1964.

<sup>18</sup>"Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons," People's Daily, editorial October 22, 1964, Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 15.

<sup>19</sup>New York Times, May 10, 1966.

<sup>20</sup>New York Times, May 31, 1966.

<sup>21</sup>New York Times, November 15, 1966, underline mine.

<sup>22</sup>New York Times, June 18, 1967, underline mine.

<sup>23</sup>"China Victoriously Conducts a Nuclear Hydrogen Bomb Explosion, Successfully Conducts the First Underground Nuclear Test," NCNA October 4, 1969, Peking Review No. 40 (October 3, 1969), underline mine.

<sup>24</sup>See for example, New York Times, October 18, 1964, May 17, 1965, May 11 and 12, 1966, December 30, 1967. See also Peking Review, No. 45 (November 4, 1966), 27; No. 47 (November 21, 1969), 18-9.

<sup>25</sup>These statements were reprinted in Peking Review, No. 47 (November 21, 1969), 10-11.



<sup>26</sup> See Hindu October 29, 1964. See also W.L. Ryan and S. Summerlin, China Cloud: America's Tragedy and China's Rise to Nuclear Power (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), 190.

<sup>27</sup> This statement was made in 1966. See W. L. Ryan and S. Summerlin, China Cloud, 241.

<sup>28</sup> See M. R. Masani, "The Challenge of the Chinese Bomb-II" India Quarterly, Vol. XXI, No. 1 (January-March 1965), 23. See also The Times (London), December 5, 1964.

<sup>29</sup> See "World Reactions to the Chinese Nuclear Bomb" Foreign Affairs Reports, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January, 1965), 9.

<sup>30</sup> See New York Times, October 17, 1964, October 18, 1964, December 5, 1964, May 15, 1965, November 4, 1966.

<sup>31</sup> This statement was made by Sato in 1965. Quoted by Kei Wakaizumi in his "The Problem for Japan," A World of Nuclear Powers? ed. Alastair Buchan, 82.

<sup>32</sup> See for example, Peking Review, No. 22 (May 27, 1966), 38; No. 45 (November 4, 1966), 27.

<sup>33</sup> Sisir Gupta, "The Indian Dilemma," 61-2.

<sup>34</sup> "Statements of the Chinese Government Advocating the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons and Proposing a Conference of the Government Heads of All Countries of the World" July 31, 1963, People of the World, Unite, for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 5.

<sup>35</sup> People's Daily, editorial, November 22, 1964, Break the Nuclear Monopoly, . . . . , 24.

<sup>36</sup> "The Sato Government Does not Know Which Way the Wind Blows," Peking Review (November 27, 1964), 16-18. See also Ibid. (December 18, 1964), 6-8.

<sup>37</sup> "Japanese Reactionaries' Pipe Dream," Peking Review, No. 38 (September 19, 1969), 27.

<sup>38</sup> See Kim Ting, "Analysis of the Direction of Communist China's Conventional Forces after Its Nuclear Test," Communist Chinese Affairs Monthly, Vol. 7, No. 11 (December 31, 1964), 85-90.



<sup>39</sup>For details of these highways, see supra, 111ff.

<sup>40</sup>Alice Langley Hsieh, "China's Secret Military Papers: Military Doctrine and Strategy," China Quarterly, No.18 (April-June, 1964), 98, 87. See also "Resume of Discussion at the Ground Force Training Conference Concerning the Implementation of the Policy of Compactness and Quality," Bulletin of Activities, No. 27, (July 25, 1961) See also "The Combat Rules and Regulations of Our Army Are the Product of Mao Tse-tung's Military Thought," by the Military Science Academy, Bulletin of Activities, No.29 (August 1, 1961), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, ed. J. Chester Cheng, (Stanford, California: Stanford University, 1966), 674-689. 729-735.

<sup>41</sup>For discussion of such an Asian collective system, see for example, Arthur S. Lall, "The Political Effects of the Chinese Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (February, 1967). 22; Donald Edward Kennedy, The Security of Southern Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 234.

<sup>42</sup>See Alastair Buchan, "An Asian Balance of Power," Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.XII, (August 1966), 278ff; Walter B. Wentz, Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968)

<sup>43</sup>See Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread? (New York: Penguin, 1966), 57.

<sup>44</sup>New York Times, January 9, 1965.

<sup>45</sup>New York Times, September 8, 1968.

<sup>46</sup>Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread?, 57.

<sup>47</sup>"News Digest: India Studying N-Weapons," News dispatch from New Delhi, Edmonton Journal, January 26, 1970.

<sup>48</sup>See Kiichi Saeki and Kai Wakaizumi, "The Problems of Japan's Security," China and the Peace of Asia, ed. Alastair Buchan (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 227.

<sup>49</sup>New York Times, April 1, 1969.

<sup>50</sup>"Japan's Defence Budget up Sharply," news dispatch from Tokyo, Edmonton Journal, January 26, 1970.

<sup>51</sup>"Nixon's Vietnam Assessment", Joseph Alsop, Los Angeles Times Service, Edmonton Journal, March 6, 1969.



<sup>52</sup>Alastair Buchan, A World of Nuclear Power?, 9.

<sup>53</sup>Alastair Buchan, "An Asian Balance of Power?", 279.

<sup>54</sup>Quoted by Howard Margolis in his "The Bomb in China," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (December, 1964), 37.

<sup>55</sup>See U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Foreign Atomic List (April 1, 1967).

<sup>56</sup>Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable, (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), 212-213.

<sup>57</sup>New York Times, December 16, 1966.

<sup>58</sup>New York Times, October 28, 1966.

<sup>59</sup>New York Times, June 18, 1967.

<sup>60</sup>See "Statement by the U.S. Representative at the Geneva Conference," September 19, 1967, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 57, No. 1478 (October 23, 1967), 543-544. See also Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 27.

<sup>61</sup>"Statement by the U.S. Representative at the Geneva Conference," 545.

<sup>62</sup>"The ABM: Not Really Settled," Time Magazine, (March 21, 1969), 29.

<sup>63</sup>Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 27.



## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION: COMMUNIST CHINA AS A MAJOR NUCLEAR POWER AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

In the near future, Communist China will become a major nuclear power, with a stockpile of ICBMs and certain degree of invulnerability of its nuclear force. As a result, there will be three major national actors, namely, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China in the international system. Of course, the simple fact that a third major national actor will be added to the international system does not necessarily mean that there will be drastic major change in the structure as well as in the characteristics of the system. However, in the case that Communist China is the third major national actor, because of its foreign policy objectives and its relations with other national actors in the system, the international system will face many serious stresses as follows:

(1) While both superpowers are "conservative" and "defensive" in the sense that they both intend to maintain the status quo of the international system, Communist China is "revolutionary" and "offensive"



in the sense that it is determined to change the structure and the distribution of powers in the international system. Thus, when Communist China becomes a major nuclear power, unless there is a drastic change<sup>1</sup> in the Chinese foreign policy objectives, it is very likely that it would pursue these objectives more directly and aggressively. For example, it might use its conventional force directly or use nuclear blackmail to force or induce many national actors to support China as the leader of a new power center in the international system. Communist China might first try to establish its hegemony among countries in the traditional political Areas I, II, and III, which coincide with the Asian part of the "first intermediate zone," including countries in Southeast Asia. Afterwards, Communist China might try to establish its influence through revolutionary wars or subversions in the rest of the "first intermediate zone" which coincides with part of the traditional political Area IV, covering countries in Africa and Latin America. Verbal hostility towards the "imperialist countries" and countries in the "second intermediate zone" might be transformed into military actions, although a direct and deli-



berate attack on the homelands of the superpowers without provocation would probably not be viable, by Chinese calculation.

It is true that there appears to be a gap between Communist China's words and deeds, since Chinese bellicose statements have not been paralleled by actions, which are relatively cautious. This by no means, however, indicates that Communist China has put aside its foreign policy objectives.

To understand this peculiar phenomenon, it is first necessary to understand the difference between "strategy" and "tactics" in Communist Chinese terminology. According to the Chinese Communists, strategy refers to a war situation as a whole, while tactics refers to specific instances in a war situation.<sup>2</sup> Although strategically, one has to "despise" the enemy, tactically, one has to "respect" him:

In fighting imperialism, we are of the opinion that, strategically and with regard to the whole, one must despise the enemy, dare to struggle against him and dare to seize victory; at the same time, tactically and with regard to each specific struggle, one must take the enemy seriously and be prudent. If one does not take full account of the enemy tactically and is headless and reckless, while strategically one dares not despise the enemy, it is inevitable that one will commit the error of adventurism in tactics and that of capitulationism in strategy.<sup>3</sup>



This attitude did not change after the 1964 nuclear test. In 1965, Lin Piao said:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung points out that we must despise the enemy strategically and take full account of him tactically.<sup>4</sup>

For this reason, Communist China always "despises" the enemy in its statements, but remains very cautious in practical situations. To "respect" the enemy only means to be "cautious" and "realistic:" this Communist China indeed has been. It by no means, however, indicates that Communist China would de-emphasize its foreign policy objectives; these should still be pursued in earnest. In fact, Communist China insists that a tactical offensive is absolutely necessary.

It is possible and necessary to use tactical offensives within the strategic defensive; to fight campaigns and battles of quick decision within a strategically protracted war and to fight campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines.<sup>5</sup>

At the same time, the meaning of "strategic defensive" must not be misunderstood either. A "strategic defensive" is by no means passive or conservative in nature. Instead, its approach is still "offensive" because "passive defense" is absolutely unacceptable. As Mao said:



As far as I know, there is no military manual of value nor any sensible military expert, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, that does not oppose passive defence, whether in strategy or tactics. Only a complete fool or a madman would cherish passive defense as a talisman. However, there are people in this world who do such things. That is an error in war, a manifestation of conservatism in military matters, which we must resolutely oppose.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, when it becomes a major nuclear power with sufficient strength to act more directly and militantly, Communist China could adopt both tactical and strategic offensive policies in order to achieve its objectives. Its words then, would be paralled by actions. Communist China's attitude towards the Russian ICBM and satellite successes in 1957 supports this view. In 1957, when the Soviet Union successfully launched its first ICBM and Sputnik I, Communist China, then the closest ally of the Soviet Union, contended that a fundamental change in the world balance had taken place. Mao said:

It is my opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world today, the East wind and the West wind. There is a Chinese saying, "Either the East wind prevails over the West wind or the West wind prevails over the East wind." It is characteristic of the situation today, I believe, that the East wind is prevailing over the West wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism are overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.<sup>7</sup>



On February 10, 1958, Chou En-lai declared that there was a "new change in the long-standing superiority of the forces of socialism over those of imperialism" and called this "a new turning point in the world situation."<sup>8</sup> For this reason, Communist China urged the Soviet Union to take a more aggressive stand against the United States and its allies. In the same year, Communist China initiated a heavy bombardment of the off-shore island of Quemoy, expecting Russian support for further military activities. However, the Soviet Union apparently did not agree with the "turning point" theory and told Communist China that it would neither support the Chinese action nor initiate any military ventures in the world. This Soviet attitude forced Communist China, although very unwillingly, to withdraw from further military activities.<sup>9</sup>

Communist China's 1957 "turning point" theory and "East over West" argument suggest that when it becomes a major nuclear power, it might deem that another "turning point" has come and might therefore adopt a more aggressive policy. In fact, developments after 1964 confirm this tendency--the Communist Chinese attitude toward the political and military



significance of its nuclear weapons has changed as rapidly as its nuclear weapons development has grown. Before its first nuclear test in 1964, for instance, Communist China had not indicated that it intended to "break the monopoly" of nuclear weapons by the superpowers. It only attacked this "monopoly" indirectly by criticizing the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty:

This is a treaty signed by three nuclear powers. By this treaty they attempt to consolidate their nuclear monopoly and bind the hands of all peace-loving countries subject to nuclear threat.<sup>10</sup>

After its first nuclear test in 1964, however, Communist China argued that its decision to develop its nuclear weapons was made in order to break the monopoly:

China is developing nuclear weapons. . . to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear power.<sup>11</sup>

The alleged purpose was to stop the nuclear "black-mail" policy of the United States:

The policy of nuclear blackmail of U.S. imperialism is found on nuclear monopoly. When a further breach is made in the U.S. nuclear monopoly, its policy of nuclear blackmail will be of no avail.<sup>12</sup>

Nevertheless, in its statements, Communist China did not imply directly that its nuclear test had any



offensive military value. It only claimed that its nuclear test was conducted "solely for defensive purposes," and to ensure that the U.S. blackmail and nuclear threat would "no longer be so effective."<sup>13</sup>

However, after it conducted its first hydrogen bomb test in May 1966, Communist China, believing that it had already reached a "high level of science and technology," began to imply, very indirectly, that its test was a "positive factor" in opposing the monopoly and nuclear threat of the superpowers.

[The test] is graphic evidence of the high level of science and technology and the relative power of the great Chinese people, a most important positive factor supporting all people opposing the nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats and joint schemes of the U.S. imperialists and the Khrushchevian revisionists, as well as a powerful factor conducive to international peace and security.<sup>14</sup>

After its fourth test, the word "blow" was introduced by Communist China to describe the effects of its nuclear achievement on the "monopoly" of nuclear weapons by the superpowers. However, the word was not directly applied to the nuclear "monopoly." Rather, Communist China merely claimed that the test was a blow to the U.S. "scheme" to perpetuate "nuclear monopoly" by seeking the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.<sup>15</sup>



After its fifth and sixth tests, however, Communist China began to openly claim that its nuclear tests were "blows" to the nuclear blackmail of the superpowers:

The success of China's hydrogen bomb test has further broken the nuclear monopoly of United States imperialism and Soviet revisionism and dealt a telling blow at their policy of nuclear blackmail.<sup>16</sup>

In December 1968, after its eighth nuclear test, Communist China claimed that the test was not only a "blow" to the nuclear threat, but also a big inspiration to fight against the United States:

The success of the nuclear test dealt another blow to the nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail of American imperialism and Soviet revisionism. It is a big inspiration to carrying through to the end the war against the United States. . . .<sup>17</sup>

In October 1969, after its ninth and tenth nuclear tests, Communist China showed even more confidence in the political and military implications of its nuclear weapons achievement. The two tests were regarded as a "heavy blow" instead of merely a "blow" as it claimed after the eighth test, to the superpowers' monopoly of nuclear weapons.

These new achievements in China's development of nuclear weapons serve as another heavy blow at the nuclear monopoly by U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism.<sup>18</sup>

A month later, Communist China expressed the opinion



that the superpowers' intention to maintaining their nuclear monopoly was a vain hope.<sup>19</sup> It also declared:

Today, it is not U.S. imperialism or social-imperialism, still less the Japanese reactionaries, but the Asian peoples, who decide the destiny of Asia. In today's Asia, the great socialist China is stronger than ever and the revolutionary current of the people's struggle for national independence and people's liberation is surging ahead.<sup>20</sup>

Thus Communist China seems to believe that its nuclear weapons development would eventually create a situation most favorable for China to pursue its foreign policy objectives. When Communist China becomes a major nuclear power, therefore, the stalemate and self-restraints now prevailing between the superpowers would not prevail between the United States and Communist China or between the Soviet Union and Communist China.

(2) Since there will not be a balance of nuclear strength and capability between Communist China and either superpower, there would not be a nuclear stalemate between them. Consequently, on the one hand, Communist China will continue to increase its nuclear force. On the other hand, the superpowers,



in response to the Chinese nuclear build-up, will have to accelerate their costly and dangerous nuclear arms race far beyond their present pace in order to maintain superiority or equality over Communist China and the other superpower.

Furthermore, the situation could become even more complicated if the Chinese nuclear weapons development entailed a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation in the international system. So far, each superpower has made sure that its adversary has not developed an absolutely invulnerable nuclear system or built up an overwhelming superior nuclear force. However, as the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons increases, the process of balancing and adjusting would become more difficult. For example, in estimating the might of another superpower, each superpower will have to take into consideration not only the nuclear capability and military strength of its main adversary, but also the strength of its adversary's nuclear allies as well as the strength of its own allies. If the combined nuclear force of its adversaries appears to be strong enough to break the invulnerability of its second strike force, it would have to accelerate the building of its nuclear



force and military capability. Consequently, they would also have to engage in a dangerous strategic nuclear arms race.

(3) The emergence of Communist China as a major nuclear power, because of its foreign policy objectives, could virtually force the Asian countries notably India and Japan to develop their own nuclear weapons. Consequently, as examined in Chapter 6, a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation would become inevitable in the international system.

It is true that there are still many disincentives such as cost, to nuclear weapons development. However, it is important to note that the cost of nuclear weapons development for countries with little or no present nuclear facilities is by no means prohibitive.<sup>21</sup> As to international controls, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty are not universally accepted; nor is there any agency to enforce them. Besides, as far as the Nonproliferation Treaty is concerned, parties of the treaty can withdraw from the treaty by giving a three months notice of withdrawal.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, these "disincentives" are not quite so effective at all. Should a country get involved in a tense local conflict,



the nuclear weapons program of its adversaries would provide it with very strong security and prestige incentives to initiate their own nuclear weapons program. At present, many countries already possess the necessary resources and technology to start a nuclear weapons program. In 1967, for instance, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission reported that in addition to the present five nuclear countries, there are about forty-one countries which possess operating nuclear reactors and technology to develop nuclear weapons.<sup>23</sup> In addition, at least another twenty-five countries already have non-military nuclear facilities and the industrial and technological base for nuclear weapons development. They could possibly produce such weapons in less than ten years.<sup>24</sup> U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara also pointed out that the most advanced of the non-military nuclear countries could solve the problem of explosion technology, a necessary step in nuclear weapons development, within six months.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, the development of nuclear weapons by many Asian countries in response to the development of operational or major nuclear weapons by Communist China, may well lead to a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation in the entire



international system. As a result, the international system would face the following additional stresses which could erode the nuclear deterrence and stalemate in the present international system:

(a) As the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons increases, the probability of their being used would also increase. William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. delegation to the Conference of the then-named 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva warns that

there is the simple fact that the probability of nuclear weapons being used will almost certainly increase as the number of fingers on the triggers increase. Moreover, the increase in probability will be more than proportional to the increase in number.<sup>26</sup>

Henry Kissinger, now an adviser to U.S. President Nixon, argued in 1961 that "with many countries possessing nuclear weapons, the possibility of nuclear war obviously increases."<sup>27</sup> Perhaps the most illuminative statement was made by Herman Kahn when he said:

The possibility of inadvertent war would no doubt increase not only because there would be many more weapons and missiles available, but because there will be many more organizations in existence, each with different standards of training, organization, and degrees of responsibility. The possibility of un-



authorized behavior, irreponsibility, misunderstanding of orders, or lax discipline inevitably increases. Mistakes would increase if the military or political organization were weak or slipshod.<sup>28</sup>

Therefore, as the number of countries with nuclear weapons increases, the probability of their being used would also increase.

(b) Since the new nuclear countries would not possess an invulnerable second-strike nuclear force, some of them might be tempted to launch a preemptive nuclear attack on their adversaries or at least their nuclear facilities to eliminate the threats or potential threats from their adversaries once and for all.

(c) So far, there has been no threat of anonymous nuclear attack. An anonymous nuclear attack is one from unknown source or from a source difficult to identify in a very short time. At present, a nuclear attack on the United States would inevitably be attributed to the Soviet Union and vice versa. It is unlikely that France and Britain would launch such an attack. Since the attacker could be identified quickly and easily, an immediate retaliatory attack could be launched by the victim. Therefore, neither superpower could expect to attack its adversary and remain undetected and uns-



cathed. However, as the number of small independent nuclear countries increases, the source would become very difficult to identify.<sup>29</sup> Some nuclear countries might therefore be tempted to launch a nuclear attack on its enemies, hoping to escape detection. If such an attack were to take place in an area where tension was already quite high among various nuclear countries or where the superpowers were deeply involved, a large-scale or even a world nuclear war might become probable. On the other hand, the fear of such an attack might also tempt a nuclear country to launch a preemptive nuclear attack on its nuclear adversary. Furthermore, the simple fact that such an anonymous attack is possible at all, could cause suspicions and tensions among national actors in the international system.

(d) In a world of nuclear power, adequate communication among countries would also become much more difficult to maintain. So far, between the superpowers, channels such as the "hot line" have been able to help facilitate communication in time of crisis. However, "as the number of nuclear powers increases, the amount of attention each country can pay to one rival declines." "Such a decline, such a 'communications



overload,' far from leading to peace and prudence, complicates calculations."<sup>30</sup> Thus, "even if we assume that all future participants in the apolyptic poker game will be as coolly rational as the present two players, the game itself will have become far more complex and less predictable--hence more dangerous."<sup>31</sup> The new complexity would appear in the relations between various new nuclear powers, between the superpowers and these countries, and between the superpowers themselves. Consequently, chances of miscalculation and miscalculation would become much greater. Such a situation could be extremely dangerous in the nuclear era in which decisions have to be made in split seconds.

(4) When Communist China becomes a major nuclear power, the ability of the superpowers to restrain other national actors in the international system would also be significantly reduced. The following are some of the reasons and examples:

(a) Communist China no longer belongs to the Soviet camp. It has been isolated in the international community and virtually has no contact with the outside world. It receives no military, economic or any other kinds of aid or assistance since 1960.



Therefore, when it becomes a major nuclear power and breaks the containment imposed on it by the superpowers, neither superpower could expect to put pressures on China to restrain it from committing military mischiefs.

(b) As mentioned earlier, the superpowers have to a significant extent, restrained their camp members and other national actors from engaging in serious military conflicts. However, it would be very doubtful that such restraints could remain intact after Communist China becomes a major nuclear power. For example, the restraints the superpowers had successfully imposed on Pakistan and India during their 1965 war might have been a failure had Communist China been a major nuclear power at that time. Discrediting U.S. deterrence and containment, Communist China might have decided to offer not only substantial military aid to Pakistan but guarantee its security, and thus seriously complicate the situation and make settlement impossible. Also, if there is still any hope in reaching an agreement in the present Paris peace talks which have been accepted by South Vietnam and North Vietnam under the influence of the superpowers, such a hope would diminish if Communist China



after becoming a major nuclear power, felt more confident and decided to supply the North Vietnamese and Vietcong with substantial military aid or offer them guarantees of security. The Chinese attacks on the Paris peace talks and their advocacy of revolutionary wars indicate that Communist China might take this course of action. In the Middle East, Communist China over the past years consistently attacked Israel and supported the Arab people.<sup>32</sup> Many Chinese aids have been sent to Egypt, and an agreement on scientific and technical co-operation between Egypt and Communist China was signed in Cairo in January 1965.<sup>33</sup> The agreement was followed, in April, by an announcement in the informed Egyptian newspaper, Al Ahram, that Egyptian scientists were about to be sent to Communist China to receive training at China's nuclear installations.<sup>34</sup> When Communist China becomes a major nuclear power, its interest and involvement in the area would certainly increase. But a substantial Chinese military aid to Egypt may significantly change the delicate balance of power in that area as well as render futile any efforts made by the super-powers to press the parties involved to reach a settlement. Communist China's recent support of the outsted



Cambodia head Sihanouk while both superpowers tend to restrain their "allies" in Indochina from taking advantage of the situation, further indicate what a complicated situation the international system would have to face when Communist China becomes a major nuclear power.

Furthermore, Communist China has regarded any joint efforts made by the superpowers to maintain the status quo of the international system as "plots" to maintain their "co-domination" of the world. Such a Chinese attitude and position could have tremendous reverse effects on these efforts. For example, in view of Communist China's severe attacks on the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and its refusals to have anything to do with them, it is very doubtful whether many countries would still honor the treaties once Communist China becomes a major nuclear power.

(c) The willingness of the camp members and other national actors to subject themselves to the restraining powers of the superpowers would also be reduced when Communist China becomes a major nuclear power. For one thing, if the future Chinese nuclear



weapons can definitely imperil the homelands of the superpowers and cause irreparable damage to them, Asian and other countries probably would not believe any commitments or guarantees offered by either superpower, doubting that the superpowers would risk their own cities and population to come to their rescue. As Sisir Gupta has pointed out, "if the Chinese even succeed in building up a strategic balance with the U.S., . . . it is very questionable if [the United States] would sacrifice Boston for Bombay or Detroit for Delhi."<sup>35</sup>

Even if the superpowers' guarantees were still available and credible, the present two camp system would still undergo some changes. For instance, if the United States decided to offer a guarantee of security to countries such as India against a potential Chinese nuclear threat, American allies such as Japan and Thailand might feel that since non-aligned countries virtually enjoy the same privileges and protections from the superpowers as they do, there is little incentive for them to remain in the U.S. camp. On the other hand, if the United States refuses to offer a guarantee of security to any country aligned or non-aligned, the American allies or camp members



might feel that since they are in the same position as the non-aligned countries it is unprofitable to stay in the camp. A similar situation would be true in the Soviet Camp.

The situation could be more complicated and the two camp system more unstable if many camp members decide to develop their own nuclear weapons in response to the emergence of Communist China as a major nuclear power. Of course, the precise way the development of a nuclear arsenal by a small or middle power will affect its position in one of the two camps is uncertain. Much will depend on the individual situation, e.g., the way in which it attempts to exploit its nuclear weapons, the reactions of other countries etc. Thus , in the case of Britain, the strains of proliferation may not at all impair its relations with the United States; but the same cannot be said to the cases of Communist China and France in which their relations with the superpowers have deteriorated.

Nuclear proliferation in the international system tends to have a negative impact on the relations between the superpowers and their camp members. For a new nuclear country, the possession of nuclear weapons may make it feel that it is an "independent" country



and therefore should enjoy a greater degree of autonomy. Consequently, it may feel that it can make key decisions for itself without the consent of the superpower. As Hans J. Morgenthau observes, "a nation will shun alliances if it believes that it is strong enough to hold its own unaided."<sup>36</sup> R.C. Snyder also observes that the possession of nuclear weapons might lead to intrabloc tension within an alliance system.<sup>37</sup> Consequently, there would inevitably be disruptive effects on the present two camp system.

On the other hand, the superpowers might decide to shun alliances or small nuclear camp members if they feel that the burden of military or political commitments appears too heavy to bear or if they feel there is a great danger of getting involved in a local nuclear conflict.

As the superpowers and other national actors further alienate each other in a world of nuclear powers, the restraining power of the superpowers over their camp members and other national actors would inevitably be reduced.

(5) When Communist China becomes a major nuclear



power, many countries, especially those in Asia, might decide or be forced to join the Chinese camp, or become constant supporters of Chinese foreign policy. Consequently, the size, strength and the functioning of the non-aligned actors in the international system would be greatly reduced.

(6) The reduction in size and significance of the non-aligned actors would also seriously affect the functioning of the United Nations as a "preventive diplomacy" or "preventive security" agency in the international system. Furthermore, these countries have so far regarded the United Nations not only as a significant organization for the maintenance of world peace, but as the protector of their integrity and independence. As Francis O. Wilcox explains,

the great powers do not need the United Nations; at any rate, they can defend themselves in time of peril. Similarly, the aligned countries, associated with the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact and other pacts, and with the Western powers in NATO, CENTO, SEATO, the Rio pact and other defense agreements, have certain assurances against aggression and are less inclined to turn to the United Nations for protection. But the nonaligned countries, without the protective umbrella of the United Nations, would be standing relatively unshielded and alone in a world where aggressors could often take their tool.

To the smaller nations, and the nonaligned countries in particular, the United Nations has tremendous value. It was designed to protect



their independence and integrity and to help them raise their standards of living. It is also a center where a smaller state, without much status or prestige, can greatly enhance its influence by joining with other states to realize common policy objectives. Even more important, membership in the U.N. is a symbol of each country's standing and dignity as a sovereign entity.<sup>38</sup>

However, when these non-aligned countries become nuclear countries in response to Chinese nuclear development, they would feel that since they have nuclear weapons, they do not have to depend on the Organization for the maintenance of their independence and sovereignty. Should they get involved in a local conflict, they would think that nuclear weapons could be used as a last resort for final victory or for a showdown with their adversaries. Consequently, their willingness to accept a U.N. mediation would significantly decrease. In this regard, U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara seems to be correct when he says that if armed conflicts were to occur between countries without nuclear weapons, the international agencies of peace-keeping and conflict adjustment could often be able to operate effectively; but with countries possessing nuclear weapons, these peace-keeping activities may become impossible.<sup>39</sup> Although the word "impossible" might be too strong, the task of peace-keeping would certainly become much more difficult.



When Communist China emerges as a major nuclear power, the international political system, i.e., the "loose-bipolar system", will become very unstable. While the addition of a third major nuclear power would inevitably change the basic structural pattern of the international system, with Communist China as the third major national actor, there will be more than simply minor structural changes. The above discussion clearly indicates that when Communist China becomes a major nuclear power, because of its foreign policy objectives and its relations with other national actors in the international system, the stability of the system would significantly if not completely, diminish. Several serious changes in the characteristics of the system, e.g., the decreasing restraining power of the superpowers over other national actors; the diminishing effectiveness of the present nuclear stalemate and nuclear deterrence; the reduction in the functions and significance of the universal actor, i.e., the United Nations, and the non-aligned actors in the international system, would take place.

In other words, the system of national actors or groups of national actors that are essential to the maintenance of the stability of the international



system would be irreversably changed: (1) There will be three major national actors leading to the consequences already discussed; (2) the two camp system would be further eroded or would disappear completely; (3) the number of the non-aligned actors would be significantly reduced; (4) while the universal actor might be able to persist, its functions and significance would be greatly reduced.



## Notes (Conclusion)

1. Such drastic changes could happen as a result of a civil war or similar events.

2. See "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," Selected Works, I (New York: International Publishers, 1954), 180.

3. "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 21," September 1, 1963, People of the World, Unite, for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 60.

4. See Lin piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," People's Daily, September 2, 1965, Peking Review No. 36 (September 3, 1965), 9-31.

5. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan," May 1938, Selected Military Writings (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 155.

6. Mao Tse-tung, "Problem of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Selected Works, I (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 207.

7. Comrade Mao Tse-tung on "Imperialism and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers" (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), 26. See also "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 21," Peking Review, No. 36 (September 6, 1963), 10.

8. Chou En-lai, "The Present International Situation and China's Foreign Policy," February 10, 1958, NCNA, February 11, 1958, in Current Background, No. 492, (February 14, 1958), 1-13.

9. For a detailed analysis, see Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962), 84, 87-89, 121, and 91ff. See also "The Origin and



9 (continued) Developing of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves--Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," People's Daily, editorial, and Red Flag, September 6, 1963, Peking Review, No. 37 (September 13, 1963), 6-23.

10. See People's Daily, July 31, 1963, Peking Review, No. 31 (August 2, 1963), 7-8.

11. "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," October 16, 1964, Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 3.

12. People's Daily, editorial, October 22, 1964, Break the Nuclear Monopoly. . . ., 11-19.

13. "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," October 16, 1964, 8.

14. For the text of the Chinese statement after the third test, see New York Times, May 10, 1966. See also Peking Review, No. 21 (May 20, 1966), 8.

15. See New York Times, November 4, 1966.

16. New York Times, June 18, 1967. Underline mine.

17. December 28, 1969, NCNA, reprinted in Facts & Features, Vol. II, No. 7 (January 22, 1969), 4.

18. "China Victoriously Conducts a New Hydrogen Bomb Explosion, Successfully Conducts the First Underground Nuclear Test," Peking Review, No. 40 (October 3, 1969), Hsinhua Dispatch, October 4, 1969.

19. "Essence of So-called Preliminary Talks on 'Strategic Arms Limitation,'" Peking Review, No. 46 (November 14, 1969), 28.

20. "Japanese Reactionaries Feverishly Push Policy of Armaments Expansion and War Preparations," Peking Review, No. 47 (November 21, 1969), 28.



21. For example, it has been pointed out that the American uranium bomb used on Hiroshima cost "about a billion dollars." A modest nuclear force with its own delivery system would in average cost \$230-310 million a year. For details, see Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread? 30-31. See also his "Capabilities of Non-Nuclear Powers," A World of Nuclear Power, ed. A. Buchan, 32ff. In 1966, Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission estimated that an initial nuclear program would cost a country less advanced than India about 50-100 million dollars, see New York Times, March 2, 1966.

22. For further discussion of these treaties, see Edwin Brown Firmage, "The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 63, No. 4 (October 1969), 711-746. Betty Goetz Lall, "Next: A Proliferation Ban," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January, 1966), 42-43; "The Nonproliferation Treaties Compared," Ibid., 44. B.T. Feld, "After the Nonproliferation Treaty--What Next? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September 1968), 2-3. George H. Quester, "Comments: Is the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty Enough?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November, 1967), 35-37.

23. See U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Foreign Reactor List (April 1, 1967).

24. Ibid.

25. U. S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session on S. Res. 179, February 23, and March 1 and 7, 1966, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Off., 1966), 79.

26. William C. Foster, "Risks of Nuclear Proliferation: New Direction in Arms Control and Disarmament," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43 (1964-5), 590.

27. H. A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York:Harper, 1961), 242.



28. Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), 214.

29. Many writers, including Hans J. Morgenthau and Leonard Beaton also recognized this danger. See Hans J. Morgenthau, "Has Atomic War Really Become Impossible?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (January 1956), 7-9. Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread? 32ff.

30. Stanley Hoffmann, "Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics," 107.

31. Raymond Aron, The Great Debate, 62.

32. See Chapter 5 above.

33. NCNA, Cairo, January 13, 1965, in Survey on China Mainland Press, No. 3380.

34. New York Times, April 9, 1965.

35. Sisir Gupta, "The Indian Dilemma," A World of Nuclear Power? ed. Alastair Buchan, 61.

36. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliance in Theory and Practice," Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), 184-212.

37. R. C. Snyder, Deterrence, Weapons Systems and Decision-Making (China Lake, California: U.S. Naval Ordnance Station, 1961), 70.

38. Francis O. Wilcox, "The Nonaligned States and the United Nations", Neutrality and Nonalignment, ed. Laurence W. Martin (New York, N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 123.

39. Quoted in John Silard, "Nuclear Weapons: A Liability," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (September, 1966), 18.



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